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Self-Regulation for Safety and Security:  
Final Minutes or Finest Hour? 
Douglas C. Michael ∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the accounting 
and auditing crisis later caused by the Enron and Worldcom scandals 
of that same year, created a great sense of insecurity in many Ameri-
cans.  In this Article, I analyze the federal government’s response to 
crisis.  I first define what a crisis is: a sudden, existential threat to 
which the entity has insufficient resources to respond.  I then explain 
how regulation for safety and security is unique in two aspects: per-
ceptions matter, and the assistance of the regulated entities is essen-
tial.  I proceed by describing and analyzing the regulatory history and 
crisis responses to these two instances from 2001, then compare them 
to two notable instances from the early twentieth century: the crises 
in banking and in meatpacking.  From these four examples, I extract 
a paradigm of crisis response.  The government’s initial response to a 
crisis is to provide a massive new federal presence, which is expected 
and accepted if for nothing more than its calming effect.  Shortly 
thereafter, however, the government is expected to deliver results 
that both work and appear to work.  In most instances where safety 
and security is the goal of the regulation, the public relies on the 
regulated entities to provide much of the guidance.  I seek to apply 
this paradigm to our newest policy arena: homeland security.  I con-
clude that the government has followed the paradigm I have identi-
fied and that, although there are significant differences in homeland 
security from other regulation, these four lessons from the past have 
a lot to teach us about the future. 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.  I am grateful for the 
patient attention and helpful comments from the participants at a faculty workshop 
at the St. Louis University School of Law in March, 2004. 
MICHAEL FINAL 5/25/2006  12:18:08 PM 
1076 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1075 
INTRODUCTION...................................................................................1076 
I.  SELF-REGULATORY THEORIES IN AN INSECURE WORLD .............1078 
A.  Perceptions Matter........................................................1078 
B.  Innovative Regulatory Approaches are Required........1082 
II.  THE CRISES OF 2001–02 .............................................................1086 
A.  Airplane and Airport Security ......................................1086 
B.  Public Accounting Quality Assurance..........................1096 
III.  CRISES PAST ................................................................................1103 
A.  Meat and Poultry Processing ........................................1103 
B.  Financial Institutions ....................................................1110 
1. The Banking Crisis of 1933 ........................................1110 
2. The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s .................1117 
3. Evaluation of Responses to the Bank and Thrift 
Crises ...........................................................................1119 
IV.  THE EMERGING REGULATORY PARADIGM AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY.....................................................................................1121 
A.  The Crisis and Response...............................................1122 
B.  Moving from Assurance to Results ...............................1124 
1. Effective Reorganization.............................................1124 
2. Centralization and Decentralization..........................1126 




Regulation is a political process, where perception can matter as 
much as reality.1  Two recent events—the September 11, 2001 attacks 
and the spate of accounting and audit failures beginning later that 
same year with the Enron and Worldcom scandals—have left many 
Americans doubtful that those in charge of at least two industries can 
self-regulate in matters of safety or security.  At first consideration, 
terrorist attacks and corporate scandals may seem to have nothing in 
common but coincidence.  President Bush, in signing major corpo-
rate reform legislation, clearly linked the two events: 
Terrorists attacked the center and symbol of our prosperity.  A re-
cession cost many American workers their jobs.  And now corpo-
rate corruption has struck at investor confidence, offending the 
conscience of our nation.  Yet, in the aftermath of September the 
 
 1 See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 
357, 384 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (“By far the largest number of regulatory issues 
discussed in this book arose not because of a fundamental shift in technology or 
prices, but because perceptions about what constituted a problem changed.”). 
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11th, we refuse to allow fear to undermine our economy.  And we 
will not allow fraud to undermine it either.2 
Former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey L. 
Pitt, referring to both the financial collapse of Enron and the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, noted that “[c]rises like these require us to reas-
sess how our system functions for us; they also require us to assess 
how we function in our system.”3  Although 2001 is beginning to seem 
like a more distant tragedy, these events will surely frame the next few 
years’ thinking about the proper role of the government in supervis-
ing those who assure us that regulatory systems are functioning prop-
erly, and as we seek to provide safety and security in the post-
September 11 world. 
A major question still unresolved is: Will government rely to any 
significant degree on the regulated entities themselves?  The popular 
sentiment, for the moment, is “no.”  Many private regulations have 
recently been removed from private hands.  Airport security has been 
taken over in part by the federal government.4  A new board under 
federal supervision has been created to regulate the accounting pro-
fession.5 
Nonetheless, regulatory theory suggests that continued deep in-
volvement of the players in the regulated industries will be critical in 
these areas.  Safety and security regulation has unique aspects that 
make reliance on regulated entities particularly useful in designing 
systems that are safe and that appear safe. 
I submit in this Article that self-regulation, properly imple-
mented and supervised, is a key part of any successful solution.  This 
may be especially important as we move toward vast new frontiers of 
homeland security regulation with a new federal department whose 
mission is not only physical safety but peace of mind. 
In Part I, I review principles of crisis and response, and explain 
why the recent regulatory developments in “process regulation” are 
uniquely suited to the task of safety and security regulation.  Part II 
reviews the two recent crises which together have increased Ameri-
cans’ insecurities: the airplane hijackings of September 11, 2001, and 
 
 2 Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec., President Bush Signs 
Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html.  The bill of which President Bush spoke is 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, discussed in detail infra in Part II.B. 
 3 Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks 
at the SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch540.htm. 
 4 See infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text. 
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the crisis in accounting and auditing of our public companies which 
followed shortly thereafter, beginning only a month later with En-
ron’s initial announcement of accounting irregularities.  In Part III, I 
discuss two very close historical parallels to these crises: the meatpack-
ing crisis of 1906 and the banking crisis of 1933 with its reprise in 
1989.  From these histories, both recent and distant, we can draw les-
sons in crisis response and regulation.  In Part IV, I apply these les-
sons to the emerging and puzzling task of providing homeland secu-
rity for America.  I conclude that we can profitably apply these 
regulatory theories, with the aid of four demonstrations from history, 
to provide regulation which allows Americans to both be and feel safe 
and secure. 
I. SELF-REGULATORY THEORIES IN AN INSECURE WORLD 
Most policy analysts have recognized the general utility of private 
actors in programs of government regulation.  The conditions and 
criteria for success, and the likelihood of success, vary according to 
the uses to which the private actors and the government powers are 
put, of course.  This is also true with security self-regulation.  There 
are two basic unique facets of safety and security regulation to keep in 
mind in order to create effective programs.6  First, perceptions mat-
ter.  That is, an important part of the success of a safety and security 
program is whether it feels safe.  Second, self-regulation by its nature 
does not admit to traditional “command and control” regulation or 
“end of the pipe” assessment.  There is no good measure of success 
nor permitted amount of failures.  Terrorism is not a known disease 
nor a hazard capable of measurement.  Thus, we will generally not 
know when we have been successful.  Failure, unfortunately, will be 
tragically obvious.  With each facet, there are different implications 
for the government-private mix of responsibility. 
A. Perceptions Matter 
People’s beliefs are an important subject of safety and security 
regulation.7  Regulatory systems must not only be effective, but they 
 
 6 Although I use the terms together, “safety” and “security” are not synonymous, 
but are both relevant for purposes of this discussion.  “Security concerns itself with 
intentional actions. . . . Protecting assets from unintentional actions is safety, not secu-
rity. . . . In some ways this is an arbitrary distinction, because safety and security are 
similar, and the things that protect from one also protect from the other.”  BRUCE 
SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 
12 (2003). 
 7 See Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y. 681, 696 (2002) (“[I]n a democracy, the public is in the saddle.  When 
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must appear to be effective in order to restore and maintain confi-
dence.8  If people perceive a crisis, they expect immediate and force-
ful action at the highest levels.9 
A crisis can be defined as an existential threat to a system with 
little time, structure or resources available for an immediate effective 
response.10  The lack of resources available to meet the threat is 
probably the most critical element.11  In order to trust the govern-
mental response, the public must perceive it to be “(a) competent, 
(b) open, (c) concerned, and (d) reliable.”12  Ordinarily, this means 
“retreat” by the public to a familiar trusted circle of advisers.13  Per-
ceptions are important at this juncture, because fear makes impossi-
ble the rational analysis that can form the basis for trust, thus, more 
heuristic approaches are substituted.14  “When you’re living in fear, 
it’s easy to let others make security decisions for you.  You might pas-
sively accept any security offered to you.  This isn’t because you’re 
somehow incapable of making security trade-offs, but because you 
don’t understand the rules of the game.”15  Thus, “trust” in govern-
ment in a crisis situation does not mean the same as “trust” in gov-
 
the public is terrified, elected officials gallop.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: 
Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 70 (2002) (“[I]f public fear is intrac-
table, it will cause serious problems, partly because fear is itself extremely unpleasant 
and partly because fear is likely to influence conduct, possibly producing wasteful 
and excessive private precautions.  If so, a governmental response, via regulatory 
safeguards, would appear to be justified if the benefits, in terms of fear reduction, 
justify the costs.”). 
 8 Posner, supra note 7, at 682–83.  Posner makes the distinction as one between 
using regulation to minimize risks that people fear, and using regulation to reduce 
fear.  Both are difficult, but the latter is more ambitious and offers the most hope for 
undermining the use of terror to achieve political objectives.  Id.  See also SCHNEIER, 
supra note 6, at 9 (“Security is both a feeling and reality.  We’re secure when we feel 
protected from harm . . . . In this way, security is merely a state of mind.”). 
 9 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 98 (discussing “The Demand for Law” in crisis 
situations).  The irrationality of such expectations is apparent, but the expectations 
persist nonetheless.  See Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2002–
06 (2001) (discussing how the correct regulatory response depends upon the nature 
of the fear or panic). 
 10 Aneil K. Mishra, Organizational Responses to Crisis: The Centrality of Trust, in 
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 261, 262 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996). 
 11 See Eugene J. Webb, Trust and Crisis, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, 
at 288, 290. 
 12 Mishra, supra note 10, at 265 (citations omitted). 
 13 Webb, supra note 11, at 292; see also Mishra, supra note 10, at 270–71 (noting 
also increased reliance on decentralized decisionmaking). 
 14 See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organiza-
tion, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 479–84 (1993) (differentiating between “calculated” and 
“personal” trust). 
 15 SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 8. 
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ernment in normal situations, where the government is charged with 
the promotion of legal compliance, long-term stability, and reliability 
of commercial relations.16  Indeed it is more like the trust placed in 
others in more social situations, where the trust is not based on ra-
tional calculations of probable advantage, but on social cues, and 
personal relationships.17  This type of personal trust begins to resem-
ble the law’s fiduciary relationship.18  One writer goes further to sug-
gest that reliance on government exists perhaps out of resignation 
“because [such institutions] are virtually necessary, or at least very 
helpful, to us and because we begin to have a fairly high degree of 
confidence that they will perform better for us than any extant alter-
native.”19 
However, the assurance provided by the initial governmental re-
sponse is often short-lived.20  Professor Robert Hahn’s words about air 
 
 16 See, e.g., Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 523, 527–32 (2001) (evaluating elements of trust as displayed between 
parties to a commercial transaction); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 
81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 340–46 (2001) (analyzing individuals’ trust in each other to 
comply with the tax laws versus individuals’ apprehension of likely penalties for non-
compliance).  Further distinct still is the trust that individuals place in others within 
the same group or organization.  See, e.g., Walter W. Powell, Trust-Based Forms of Gov-
ernance, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 51, 51 (analyzing trust within 
and among commercial firms); Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational 
Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST 
IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 331, 331 (analyzing trust within hierarchical or-
ganizations generally). 
 17 See Williamson, supra note 14; Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
553, 563–68 (2001) (discussing trust generated by personal relationships, norms, and 
“social capital”). 
 18 Compare United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (defining 
a fiduciary relationship in the securities fraud context as one involving “reliance” or 
“confidence” on the one side and “control,” “dominance,” or “superior influence” on 
the other), with Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 
(2002) (generally defining personal trust as “the optimistic acceptance of a vulnerable 
situation in which the trustor believes the trustee will care for the trustor’s interests”). 
 19 Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 520 (2001); see also Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other 
Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 280 (2004) (noting that laws passed in response to terrorist 
and accounting crises were “based far less on a calculated cost-benefit assessment of 
the likelihood of their effectiveness than a populist need to exhibit taking control”). 
 20 See Posner, supra note 7, at 688 (noting that fear decreases over time); Mark C. 
Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration, 
“Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 437 
(2002) (“An obvious and extensive federal presence could alleviate some . . . fears, 
and consequently bring [air] passengers back. . . . Presumably, security fears will di-
minish over time, and as the public’s confidence in air travel increases, the benefit 
provided by federal involvement in screening will diminish in comparison to the ad-
ditional costs that such involvement produces.”). 
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safety regulation could be extended to apply generally to our post-
September 11 world. 
[P]oliticians of all stripes have a strong tendency to overreact in 
the face of a crisis.  Their overreaction is desirable to the extent 
that their rhetoric has a calming effect.  But when their rhetoric 
yields hastily assembled policies, the results are often less than 
benign.  Policy proposals offered in the heat of the moment, 
therefore, should be received with a healthy dose of skepticism.21 
Whether wise from a policy standpoint, the immediate and forceful 
federal response to terrorist threats and stock market meltdowns 
should not be surprising from a political standpoint.  When appear-
ances matter, visible, central, immediate, and comprehensive regula-
tion is needed.  These features respond directly to what created the 
crisis in the first place: an existential threat coupled with inadequate 
resources to deal with it.  The unabashed rush to direct federal regu-
lation following these human and financial catastrophes, although 
predictable in theory, was nonetheless remarkable in its speed and 
unanimity.  The robustness of this observation is even greater given 
that the prevailing political mantra of the late twentieth century was 
that the federal government should be smaller and better, but at least 
smaller in any event.22 
Thus, perceptions matter because, in a crisis, people do not have 
the luxury of rational choice.  A crisis may also create fear, and an 
immediate response is expected—indeed, required—by those nor-
mally perceived to be in control.  This response is intended to reas-
sure the public, as by definition the nature and scope of the threat is 
unknown, and to provide credibility to the response by placing it in 
the familiar hands of experts.23  When the problem is national in 
scope, that normally implies a federal government response.24 
 
 21 Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of the 
White House Commission’s Recommendations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 791, 812 
(1997); see also Cunningham, supra note 19, at 320 & n.207 (describing how crisis re-
sponse is usually an inadequate and improper overreaction because “[t]he pressure 
to respond quickly is too great”). 
 22 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory 
State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1468–83 (1996) (comprehensive history of twentieth 
century regulation in the United States).  McGarity observes that “for those who feel 
unduly constrained by regulation, these are heady times; and for those who have de-
pended upon the federal government to protect them from the unconstrained exer-
cise of private economic power, these are dangerous times.”  Id. at 1483–84. 
 23 See Posner, supra note 7, at 691–93 (discussing how “signaling” (visible gov-
ernmental action) is a regulatory instrument of reassurance and credibility). 
 24 One analyst notes that in dealing with terrorism, “[a]t least in one respect, the 
role of the government is clear.  The public expects the Federal government to pro-
tect citizens from external threats.”  Brent K. Marshall et al., Terrorism as Disaster: Se-
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B. Innovative Regulatory Approaches are Required 
We can expect the importance of this federal presence, standing 
alone, to diminish slightly over time.  In the long run, the fact that 
the regulation is credible and effective will be more important in di-
minishing fear.  This is because, given the luxury of time, the trust re-
lationship evolves from the initial personal, heuristic, or emotional 
trust into one which is more rational and calculating.25  The initial re-
assurances must be backed up with reaction, and the initial credibility 
signaled by government involvement and confidence must be backed 
up with results.  This challenge can be exacerbated by passage of time 
which, among other things, changes people’s recollection of the 
magnitude of the crisis.26 
The results, however, may be difficult to deliver.  Safety and se-
curity is impossible to assure, and regulation of it is difficult to super-
vise because it does not admit to traditional “end of the pipe” inspec-
tion.27  We cannot say that a flight had an “acceptable risk” of a 
terrorist attack, or that a company’s financial statements were ninety-
seven percent free of fraud.  In many cases, of course, we will not 
know that our prevention and deterrence measures have been suc-
 
lected Commonalities and Long-Term Recovery for 9/11 Survivors, in TERRORISM AND 
DISASTER: NEW THREATS, NEW IDEAS 73, 80 (Lee Clarke ed., 2003). 
 25 Trust and game theorists would posit that this is due to the existence of many 
iterations in the game, allowing for repeated observations of the other’s conduct and 
the ability to determine if trust was well- or foolishly-placed.  See supra note 16 and ac-
companying text. 
 26 See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Recollection Bias and the Combat of 
Terrorism, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (2005).  Viscusi and Zeckhauser describe this bias as 
the tendency of individuals to understate the risk when viewed after the fact.  They 
discuss surveys given to students at three different professional schools: 
     Quite remarkably given the magnitude and surprise of the Septem-
ber 11 attack, 57 percent of respondents exhibited recollection bias: 
they stated that the risks were no greater post- than preattack.  The 
current risk estimates of those exhibiting recollection bias were no 
lower than the estimates of those who did not exhibit such bias; the 
bias was not due to a failure to perceive the risks after September 11 as 
others do.  Rather, it was a failure to recognize that they had updated 
their risk beliefs, just as others had. 
Id. at 51. 
 27 See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations 
in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705, 712 (2003) 
(“[W]hen direct and continuous monitoring of smokestack emissions is possible, 
performance can be clearly verified.  In contrast, performance cannot be directly 
measured for rare and catastrophic events, and instead must be predicted, making 
implementation more difficult.”). 
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cessful.28  As the effort moves from assurance to achievement, how-
ever, there is a clear incentive to rely on the regulated industries.  
They alone have the expertise and incentive to innovate and succeed 
where government regulation cannot, and they can use that advan-
tage to produce more effective regulation.29  This was noted by a for-
mer securities industry regulator and now a leading member of pri-
vate industry, in a speech shortly after the September 11 attacks, 
about the “new normal” of a post-September 11 world and how the 
largely self-regulated securities industry will respond: 
 I am not enough of a sage to be certain whether this new nor-
mal will be better or worse than the old.  Certainly in a number of 
ways it will be less convenient and more costly, at least in the short 
run. . . . 
 . . . . 
 One of the key factors in our markets’ success and resiliency 
throughout this period has been the strength of our regulatory 
system. . . . 
 Self-regulation brings to bear a keen practical understanding of 
the industry.  It taps resources and perspectives that are not as 
readily available to governments. . . . 
 That is why self-regulation is so well suited to help usher in the 
new normal in the securities industry.  Because no one has a 
stronger incentive than [the industry] to ensure that their disaster 
recovery and business continuity plans—to take just one big ex-
ample—are fully adequate . . . . And no one can bring greater re-
sources or expertise to bear than our industry, acting collectively, 
to see that such plans are not only formulated, but followed.30 
How can the regulated industries’ expertise be employed?  There is, 
fortunately, an answer in modern regulatory theory. 
 
 28 See id. at 721 (noting that in the case of the combination of complex systems 
and low-probability events, “meaningful performance measures or indicators may be 
difficult to define”). 
 29 See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–32 (1992) (describing a model of en-
forced self-regulation); Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regu-
lations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535, 554–58 (1996) (same); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Or-
dering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319 (2002) (advocating government supervision and control 
of self-regulation when goals other than efficiency are involved).  But see Coglianese 
et al., supra note 27, at 719 (contending that performance-based regulation might 
encourage the agencies to “accept too readily the analysis provided by the regulated 
entities”). 
 30 Mary L. Schapiro, President, NASD Regulation, Inc., The A.A. Sommer, Jr. 
Annual Lecture on Corporate Securities & Financial Law: The New Normal: Changes 
in Self-Regulation and the Securities Industry in the Wake of the 9/11 Tragedy (Nov. 
13, 2001), in 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 8–9 (2001). 
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Regulatory theory has, in recent years and in many areas, devel-
oped along the lines of “process” regulation.31  In process regulation, 
the end result is not inspected and found compliant or in violation; 
rather, the regulatory process is developed and measured against cri-
teria of efficacy and reliability.32  Risks are identified and measures are 
put in place to control those risks.33  Process regulation is especially 
well-suited to areas such as safety and security regulation because per-
formance-based detection and enforcement is not as much of a chal-
lenge as design-based or process-based prevention.34  Prevention of 
failures is what process regulation is designed to do.35 
Process regulation necessarily enlists the help of the regulated 
entities.  Indeed, it may go further and vest them with primary re-
sponsibility for development of an effective prevention program.36  It 
is clear that those involved in each industry may be best-suited to 
identify the greatest security risks and develop the initial set of pre-
ventative measures.  Recent initiatives in the area of computer sys-
tems defense and protection indicate a preference for industry par-
ticipation.37  In addition, safety and security experts routinely employ 
 
 31 For a full discussion of one most robust example, see infra Part III.A (devel-
opments in meat and poultry processing).  See also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Gov-
ernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (environmental regula-
tion); McGarity, supra note 22 (general review of regulatory reforms). 
 32 See, e.g., Neal D. Fortin, The Hang-Up with HACCP: The Resistance to Translating 
Science Into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 565, 567 (2003) (“Although the tra-
ditional inspection works well at accomplishing what it was designed to achieve—
cleaner food produced under more sanitary conditions—, it is inadequate in pre-
venting many foodborne illnesses.  Whereas traditional food safety assurance pro-
grams rely on general sanitation inspections and end-product testing, HACCP [proc-
ess regulation] identifies the risks and then applies preventative control measures.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 33 See, e.g., id. 
 34 In theory, regulation likely is not solely “performance-based” or “design-based,” 
but lies on a spectrum between those two endpoints.  Coglianese et al., supra note 27, 
at 712. 
 35 See id. at 721 (“[P]erformance-based regulation may often require the applica-
tion of performance indicators so that agencies can intervene before an undesirable 
event occurs.”). 
 36 See id. at 709–10 (listing different types of performance-based standards, rang-
ing from those with loose specifications to those that more closely resemble tradi-
tional “command and control” regulation). 
 37 See Richard Clarke, National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-terrorism, National Security Counsel, Keynote Address for the Terror-
ism and Business Conference Dinner Reception: Threats to U.S. National Security: 
Proposed Partnership Initiatives Towards Preventing Cyber Terrorist Attacks (Oct. 
14, 1999), in 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 33, 41 (2000) (“We think that these computer de-
fense centers in the various sectors; transportation, electricity, banks, can create best 
practices, establish benchmarks and work with the insurance industry and with the 
audit industry so that there is a benefit to a company that is living up to the best 
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so-called “red teams”: insiders given the job of acting as outsiders to 
defeat the existing protective mechanisms.38  Industry has already re-
sponded to the need for emergency preparedness with proposed na-
tional standards for the private sector.39 
Such involvement of private industry—those most knowledge-
able about their systems and their vulnerabilities—is critical in estab-
lishing safety and security in the context of surprise attacks.  “It is im-
possible to be strong everywhere, or to respond to every alarm with 
costly defensive measures (such as grounding all civil aviation, as in 
the wake of September 11), or to eavesdrop on every plotter.”40  Even 
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis will yield a large number of poten-
tial threats against which no defensive measures can or should be 
taken.41  Determining which avenues are best traveled and which are 
best left alone is difficult in any event, but the additional information 
supplied by the entities involved will make the decision easier. 
 
practices.”).  Earlier, in Presidential Decision Directive 63, President Clinton identified 
the use of “A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability,” including recom-
mending plans for risk reduction and attack prevention.  See White Paper: The Clin-
ton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 63, Pt. IV (May 22, 1998) [hereinafter Presidential Decision Directive 
63], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/white_pr.htm.  For a 
background of the development of this and related initiatives, see RICHARD A. 
CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 166–70 (2004).  In-
frastructure protection is discussed further infra Part IV. 
 38 See, e.g., Frank J. Cilluffo et al., Bad Guys and Good Stuff: When and Where Will the 
Cyber Threats Converge?, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 131, 161–62 (2000) (describing “red 
team” exercise effects on power grid, military control systems, and 911 emergency re-
sponse networks, even with limited “rules of engagement”); Eric Talbot Jensen, Com-
puter Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-
Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L.  207, 211 & n.19 (2002) (describing similar exercises 
aimed at Defense Department computer networks); John Fialka, Wackenhut to Test Se-
curity at Nuclear Plants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2004, at A4 (describing simulated attacks 
on nuclear power plants). 
 39 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 397–98 (2004) [hereinafter THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (recommending adoption of the American National 
Standards Institute (“ANSI”) “National Standard on Disaster/Emergency Manage-
ment and Business Continuity Programs,” developed by ANSI at the 9/11 Commis-
sion’s request). 
 40 RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN 
THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 86 (2005); see also THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, 
at 364 (“What should Americans expect from their government in the struggle 
against Islamist terrorism?  The goals seem unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in 
the world.  But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is 
probably coming; it may be terrible.”). 
 41 POSNER, supra note 40, at 95.  Posner’s cost-benefit analysis preceding this 
point, although hypothetical, is analytically rigorous. 
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II. THE CRISES OF 2001–02 
This Part reviews the self-regulatory developments in safety and 
security related to the infamous airline and accounting crises of 2001 
and 2002. 
A. Airplane and Airport Security 
The four hijackings of September 11, 2001, were, first and fore-
most, a crisis in aviation safety and security.  Although the terrorist at-
tack aspect of the event has assumed equal or greater significance, 
this part deals solely with the aviation regulation aspects of the disas-
ters that day. 
The basic arrangement in the United States’ aviation safety regu-
latory system was for many years that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (“FAA”) retained general oversight and enforcement authority, 
but the first-line responsibility was delegated.42  “Air carriers [bore] 
the primary responsibility for applying security measures to passen-
gers, service and flight crews, baggage and cargo.  Airports, run by 
State or local government authorities, [were] responsible for main-
taining a secure ground environment and for providing law enforce-
ment support for implementation of airline and airport security 
measures.”43  Terrorism, and its human, psychological, and economic 
costs, has often changed this power-sharing arrangement. 
Modern aviation terrorism is widely recognized as having begun 
with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 
December 21, 1988.  With the explosion that day, it was clear that the 
major objective of the terrorists was no longer notoriety or asylum, 
but rather death and destruction for its own destabilizing sake, and 
on a scale previously unknown.44  In its wake, President Bush char-
tered a Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.45  On July 
 
 42 See generally Niles, supra note 20, 425–33. 
 43 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, STUDY AND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CIVIL 
AVIATION SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNDING 14 (1998) [hereinafter FAA 1998 
STUDY], available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Study_and_Report_ 
to_Congress_on_Civil_Aviation_Security_Responsibilities_and_Funding_1998.pdf. 
 44 See Phillip A. Karber, Re-Constructing Global Aviation in an Era of the Civil Aircraft 
as a Weapon of Destruction, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 781, 787 (2002).  Although 
there had been numerous explosions aboard aircraft, only one had been on the scale 
of the Lockerbie disaster until that time: a 1985 explosion of an Air India plane off 
the coast of Ireland, in which 329 people were killed.  REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM 166 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 45 See Exec. Order No. 12,686, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,629 (Aug. 9, 1989), resulting in the 
1990 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44. 
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17, 1996, following the crash of TWA Flight 800, initially suspected of 
being a terrorist act, President Clinton chartered a Commission on 
Aviation Security and Safety.46  These are not the only such studies, of 
course, but they are important in determining public reaction and 
public assurances in airline safety and security.  In each instance, re-
ports with recommendations were issued covering similar areas: re-
form of baggage and passenger screening and matching of baggage 
with passengers,47 improved and standardized training for security of-
ficials,48 and broad-based reform of management of the industry by 
the FAA, and even of the FAA itself.49 
In addition, Congress ventured into the arena.  The Federal 
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 199650 (“the 1996 Act”) began as a 
bill “primarily directed toward improvements in airport and airway 
infrastructure,”51 but soon became an important piece of safety and 
security legislation, as it was amended to include many of the rec-
ommendations of the Commission on Aviation Security and Safety,52 
as well as a mandate for a comprehensive study on aviation security 
responsibilities and funding.53 
The study required by the 1996 Act was issued by the FAA in De-
cember 1998.54  Important for our purposes is the FAA’s reexamina-
tion of this public-private distribution of the responsibility for air 
safety and security.  The study noted that both Presidential commis-
 
 46 See Exec. Order No. 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (Aug. 22, 1996), resulting in 
WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SEC., FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT 
CLINTON (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 47 1990 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 49 (Recommendation 4); 1997 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 36–39 (Recommendations 3.20 and 3.24). 
 48 1990 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 49 (Recommendations 2–3); 1997 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 36 (Recommendation 3.20). 
 49 The 1990 Report was especially critical of the FAA.  See, e.g., 1990 COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 44, at 53 (labeling the FAA’s regulation as “largely dictated by in-
cidents and reaction to those incidents” and concluding that the FAA “has not risen 
to the challenge” of adequately addressing security problems); see also 1997 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 9–15 (Recommendations 1.2–1.4, 1.10). 
 50 Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213 (1996) (codified as amended primarily in 
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 51 H.R. REP. NO. 104-714 at 39 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3658, 
3676. 
 52 Compare Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 §§ 301–407, 110 Stat. at 
3250–58, with S. 1994, 104th Congress §§ 301–407 (1996), 142 CONG. REC. S10,692–96 
(daily ed., Sept. 17, 1996).  The bill as amended included, according to its sponsors, 
many of the recommendations of the 1997 Commission, also known as the “Gore 
Commission.”  See 142 CONG. REC. S10,662 (daily ed., Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Pressler), S10,663 (statement of Sen. Ford). 
 53 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 § 301. 
 54 See FAA 1998 STUDY, supra note 43. 
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sions had recommended a greater federal role in this area,55 but that 
the industry remained resolute in defense of the status quo.56  An ac-
ceptable compromise appeared to be to heighten the federal role in 
the area of standard setting, particularly in relation to passenger 
screening, but to leave the carriers in charge of implementation.57  
There were many criticisms of the FAA’s explosives detection plans, 
most of them grounded in the lack of good science or technology.58 
In 1997, the FAA independently proposed comprehensive revi-
sions to its security rules for airports and air carriers.59  These rules 
 
 55 Id. at 31–34.  See also id. at 34 (quoting 1997 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, 
at 53 (“There are few areas in which the public so uniformly believes that govern-
ment should play a strong role as in aviation safety and security. . . . Problems in 
these areas contribute to an erosion of public faith in aviation, and in government it-
self.”)). 
 56 Id. at 35–36. 
 57 Id. at 41. 
     There is broad, although not universal, agreement that the regime 
of shared responsibilities should stay the same.  However, it could be 
argued that the Federal Government should increase its involvement 
by setting training standards, thereby adding to its other responsibili-
ties for capital equipment purchases, R[esearch], E[ngineering] & 
D[esign], intelligence assessments, testing countermeasures, standard 
setting, and compliance and enforcement of regulations.  Air carriers 
would still be responsible for screening, but their employees, the 
screeners and their supervisors, would be trained to standards set by 
the FAA . . . . 
Id.  The latter provision, certification of screening companies according to FAA stan-
dards, was a Congressional mandate.  See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 
1996 § 302. 
 58 See Hahn, supra note 21, at 797–98 (summarizing reviews of classified studies by 
the General Accounting Office, concluding “their findings do not inspire confi-
dence”); 1997 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 31 (“The Commission has re-
viewed numerous machines designed to detect explosives in cargo, checked baggage, 
carry-on bags, and on passengers.  There is no silver bullet.  No single machine offers 
a solution to the challenges we face.  Each machine has its own advantages and its 
own limitations.  Even machines that work fairly well in the laboratory need to be 
tested in actual use at busy airports.”); Shephard W. Melzer, Report on Aviation Safety 
Committee on Aeronautics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 64 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 771, 821–22 (1999) (reviewing current technologies, concluding that “[a] fool-
proof or ‘complete detection’ system simply does not exist”).  Lack of sound science 
continues to be a problem.  Congress in the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act has attempted to address this problem by increased funding, requiring adopting 
of new technology, and mandating further agency research.  See Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, §§ 137, 120, 112, 115 Stat. 597, at 637, 
629, 620 (2001) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter ATSA]. 
 59 See Aircraft Operator Security, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,730 (proposed Aug. 1, 1997) (to 
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108); Airport Security, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,760 (proposed 
Aug. 1, 1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 107, 139).  The FAA emphasized that 
these revisions were not the product of the TWA crash or the 1997 Commission Re-
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were finalized shortly before the September 11 attacks.60  In both in-
stances, the FAA adopted a decentralized approach to security pro-
gram management.  Both aircraft operators and airport operators are 
required to file a security “plan”61 and designate a security coordina-
tor.62  And although the regulations state specific requirements which 
each security plan must meet,63 most of the details are left to each in-
dividual plan.  This is because each plan will be different for each 
airport or airline in important respects,64 and each will include in-
formation which should remain confidential.65 
A special focus on the regulation of screeners was mandated by 
the 1996 Act,66 with proposed rules ultimately forthcoming several 
 
port; see supra note 46; Aircraft Operator Security, 62 Fed. Reg. at 41,730; Airport Se-
curity, 62 Fed. Reg. at 41,760. 
 60 See Aircraft Operator Security, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,330 (July 17, 2001) (to be codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108); Airport Security, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,274 (July 17, 2001) (to be 
codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 107, 139).  These rules were transferred largely intact to the 
new Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”).  See Civil Aviation Security, 67 
Fed. Reg. 8340, 8344–45 (Feb. 22, 2002) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 1542) (new 
regulations on airport and aircraft operator security “largely the same” as the 2001 
regulations).  In the discussion infra, I will refer to the regulations by their new post-
TSA numbers, as well as their old more familiar numbers. 
 61 See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.1 (2005) (formerly § 107.101) (Airport Operators); id.  
§ 1544.101 (formerly § 108.101) (Aircraft Operators). 
 62 See id. § 1542.3 (formerly § 107.5) (Airport Security Coordinator); id.  
§ 1544.215(a) (formerly § 108.215) (Aircraft Operator Security Coordinator). 
 63 See id. § 1542.103 (formerly § 107.103) (Contents of Airport Operator Security 
Program); 49 C.F.R. § 1544.103 (2005) (formerly § 108.103) (Aircraft Operator Se-
curity Program). 
 64 See Airport Security, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,274, 37,286 (July 17, 2002) (to be codified 
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 107, 139) (“[T]he FAA has determined that it will be easier, less dis-
ruptive, less expensive, and equally effective to not develop a standard security pro-
gram,” but rather to rely on standardized formats for the “hundreds of vastly differ-
ent security programs across the nation.”); Aircraft Operator Security, 66 Fed. Reg. 
37,330, 37,338–39 (July 17, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108) (“Aircraft op-
erators . . . have a security program . . . containing information that specifies how 
they are to perform their regulatory and statutory responsibilities. . . . The security 
program is far more detailed than the regulations, therefore, there will be items  
specifically addressed in detail that may be mentioned only in general terms in the 
rule . . . .”). 
 65 See Airport Security, 62 Fed. Reg. 41,760, 41,767 (proposed Aug. 1, 1997) (to 
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 107, 139) (“While [the regulation] is a public document 
and sets forth broad airport security requirements, the security-sensitive details of 
how an airport meets these requirements are contained separately in the airport’s 
FAA-approved, non-public security program.”); Aircraft Operator Security, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 41,730, 41,733 (proposed July 17, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108) 
(“These [security] programs are not public documents, which [protects] the meas-
ures from compromise, and they can be changed quickly to respond to threats and 
improve security as needed.”). 
 66 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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years later.67  In 2000, Congress passed the Airport Security Improve-
ment Act,68 directing specific additions to the rules governing train-
ing, security, and background checks.69  The FAA had just finished 
the final rules when the attacks came on September 11, 2001.70 
The September 11 attacks were a double challenge for the air-
lines: they created a safety crisis and exacerbated the existing finan-
cial crisis.  As for airline safety, just as Pan Am Flight 103 changed the 
face of air terrorism, September 11 changed it again.71  The use of the 
airplane as a weapon against others was as new as bombing for its own 
sake was in 1988.  Air travel security assumed unquestioned primacy, 
as the risk of failure increased by orders of magnitude not previously 
imagined.72  As for the financial problems, the resulting costs and 
precipitous drop in passenger traffic were nearly fatal to an industry 
already on the verge of financial collapse before the attacks.73 
 
 67 Certification of Screening Companies, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,724 (proposed Mar. 17, 
1997) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108).  The final proposal came almost three 
years later.  See Certification of Screening Companies, 65 Fed. Reg. 560 (proposed 
Jan. 5, 2000) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 108, 109, 111, 129, 191). 
 68 Pub. L. No. 106-528, 114 Stat. 2517 (2000). 
 69 See id. §§ 2–4, 114 Stat. at 2517–21.  In particular, Congress mandated adoption 
of the proposed rule, see supra note 67, as a final rule, with additions and responses to 
comments, by May 31, 2001.  Id. § 3(a), 114 Stat. at 2519. 
 70 Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 8340 (Feb. 22, 2002) (to be codified 
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 91, 107, 108, 109, 121, 129, 135, 139, 191; 49 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1510, 
1520, 1540, 1542, 1544, 1546, 1548, 1550) (“The final rule on certification of screen-
ing companies was approved for publication shortly before the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, occurred.”). 
 71 See Keith Sealing, Thirty Years Later: Still Playing Catch-Up with the Terrorists, 30 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 339, 342–49 (2003) (describing the four phases of air-
craft-based terrorism: the first prior to Lockerbie, the second between Lockerbie and 
September 11, the third after September 11, and the fourth beginning in November 
2002 with the use of shoulder-launched missiles fired at commercial aircraft). 
 72 See Karber, supra note 44, at 791 (demonstrating how the September 11 attacks 
are literally “off the charts” of past experience with commercial aviation terrorist at-
tacks).  There is, of course, serious debate about whether such events should have 
been or were “imagined” before.  See id. at 789 (discussing the “only known prequel 
to September 11,” a 1994 attempt to hijack an aircraft to be flown into the Eiffel 
Tower). 
 73 See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Sustainability of Air Carriers and Assurance of Ser-
vices, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 3 (2003) (“[T]he combined impact of the 2001 economic 
downturn and the steep decline in air travel after September 11 have resulted in dev-
astating losses for the airline industry.”); John Saba, Worldwide Safe Flight: Will the In-
ternational Financial Facility for Aviation Safety Help it Happen?, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 537 
(2003): 
     The irony of this “war” [on terrorism] is that it is unintentionally 
exacerbating the financial dilemma of an industry already squeezed 
with exorbitant losses.  These losses are the result of first, declining 
revenues cause[d] by a global macroeconomic slowdown, decreasing 
passenger traffic, and lower airline pricing power; and second, increas-
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Congress tackled the financial problem first, as it was the more 
critical of the two.74  The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabi-
lization Act (“ATSSSA”) was passed only eleven days after the at-
tacks.75  Its main purpose was to provide immediate financial stabil-
ity,76 with $5 billion in direct compensation and $10 billion in credit 
for the airlines.77  A key additional component to assuring the indus-
try’s survival was a limitation on liability for injuries and damage suf-
fered in the attacks.78  At this point, an important last-minute79 addi-
tion was made in the law. 
It was here that the plaintiffs’ trial lawyers and Congressional De-
mocrats stepped in, arguing that Congress could not limit the 
rights of the victims without providing an alternative remedy.  
Congressional staffers therefore conceived of the Victim Compen-
sation Fund, which would provide compensation to September 
11th victims from the United States Treasury on a no-fault basis.80 
Although this might be considered simply a legislative “quid pro 
quo” for the liability limitation on the airlines’ part, another motiva-
tion of Congress in establishing the Victim Compensation Fund was 
to provide “rapid closure” for the victims of the attacks.81 
 
ing costs resulting from challenges such as skyrocketing fuel prices and 
security upgrade requirements.  This combination inevitably leads to 
significant airline consolidation, restructuring, and bankruptcies. 
Id. at 538. 
 74 See James P. Kreindler & Brian J. Alexander, September 11 Aftermath: A Perspective 
on the VCF and Litigation, AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 18 (Winter 2004) (cit-
ing 147 CONG. REC. S9589 (daily ed., Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“If 
Congress does not pass this legislation today, it is likely that all of our Nation’s air 
carriers would cease service next Wednesday.”)). 
 75 Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.  
§ 40101 note (Supp. II 2002)) [hereinafter ATSSSA]. 
 76 See Kreindler & Alexander, supra note 74, at 18 (“Disregarding the airlines’ 
dire financial plight before September 11, the aviation lobbyists were singularly fo-
cused on leveraging this event [the September 11 attacks] to create a federally 
funded bailout of the entire aviation industry.”). 
 77 ATSSSA § 101(a) (2001). 
 78 Id. § 408(a); see Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
135, 143 (2005) (discussing legislative background). 
 79 See Kreindler & Alexander, supra note 74, at 18 (“Notably, the [Victim Com-
pensation Fund] portion of the legislation was hastily drawn up just two days before 
the Act became law.”). 
 80 Ackerman, supra note 78, at 143 (footnotes omitted).  The legislation is Title 
IV of the ATSSSA, which is separately titled the “September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund of 2001.”  See ATSSSA §§ 401–09. 
 81 See Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September 11, 
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 575–78 (2001) (describing the fund as not just a quid pro 
quo for limited liability, but reflecting the “love-hate relationship the American pub-
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Next came the problem of restoring confidence in the safety and 
security of the air transport system.  It was clear that fundamental 
changes were required.82  Congress made many of those changes in 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”),83 creating a 
new Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) in the Depart-
ment of Transportation,84 and writing new rules for aircraft security, 
mandating screening of all checked bags and cargo,85 and reassigning 
the authority for screening passengers and property. 
 
lic has with its tort system,” in this instance allowing injured parties to bypass the tra-
ditional tort system in favor of quick, certain compensation).  Much of this is conjec-
ture, as is often the case with emergency legislation of this sort.  “[A]t the time of 
passage, few people were inclined to question the philosophy or mechanics of the 
Fund.  The Fund reflected the national outpouring of grief and sympathy in the 
wake of the unprecedented attacks of September 11th.  The terrorist missions were 
attacks on the nation, and Congress and the public regarded it as altogether fitting 
that the nation as a whole should provide relief to the most directly affected victims.”  
Ackerman, supra note 78, at 144.  An interesting question is whether there is any so-
cial consensus about the appropriate national response to victims of terrorist attacks, 
which may unfortunately become an important question in the twenty-first century.  
See Rabin, supra, at 587–89 (discussing whether the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund is a model for the future). 
 82 “For the first time, terrorists don’t want only to make a political statement with 
the hijacking of one of our airplanes or the destruction of an airplane.  They have ac-
tually taken our airplane and used it as a guided bomb—a 400,000-pound bomb.”  
Scott McCartney, Airline Pro’s Altered Perspective—To Restore Public Confidence, Continen-
tal’s CEO Urges U.S. to Take Over Security, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2001, at B1 (quoting 
Continental Airlines chief executive officer Gordon M. Bethune); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S RAPID RESPONSE TEAM ON AIRPORT 
SECURITY 1 (2001), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/airportsec.htm (“Extraor-
dinary challenges require extraordinary measures.  The terrorist attacks on America 
of September 11, 2001 require that we reform our Nation’s aviation security system 
in fundamental ways.”). 
 83 Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 49 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ATSA]. 
 84 Id. at § 101, 115 Stat. at 597–604 (codified as amended primarily at 49 U.S.C.  
§ 114 (Supp. II 2002)).  This function was transferred to the Department of Home-
land Security.  See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 403, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 203(2) (Supp. II 2002)). 
 85 ATSA § 110(c), (f), 115 Stat. at 615.  The TSA’s new regulations reflect those 
changes.  See Civil Aviation Security Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 8340, 8345 (Feb. 22, 2002) 
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1544) (detailing the new requirements of the ATSA).  
Compare 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.203(c), 1544.205(b) (2005), 67 Fed. Reg. at 8367 (mandat-
ing screening of checked baggage and cargo), with 14 C.F.R. §§ 108.203, 108.205 
(repealed) (no such language).  The scanning of checked baggage was, of course, a 
major focus after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.  As to cargo, see Security Pro-
grams for Aircraft 12,500 Pounds or More, 67 Fed. Reg. 8205, 8206 (Feb. 22, 2002) 
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1540, 1544) (“[T]he events on September 11, 2001, 
demonstrate the ability to use aircraft to endanger persons on the ground.  An air-
craft so used is just as dangerous whether it holds cargo or passengers.”). 
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One of the major questions before Congress was whether the re-
sponsibility for screening would remain with aircraft operators or be-
come the direct responsibility of the federal government.86  The com-
promise reached in the ATSA was to make screening initially a job 
done directly by federal employees,87 provided that private companies 
could apply to take over the screening after two years.88  In the in-
terim, TSA has operated a pilot program of supervised private screen-
ing at five airports,89 dubbed the “PP5” program.90  A fifteen-month 
study commissioned by TSA concluded (though based on limited 
data) that the screening at the five airports was not significantly dif-
ferent in terms of cost or effectiveness from the federal program.91  
TSA now plans to expand privatization with the successor to PP5, the 
“Screening Partnership Program.”92  Although the impact on passen-
 
 86 See, e.g., Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives For, Preboard Screening 
Security Operations Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Governmental Management, Restruc-
turing and the District of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 
10 (2001) (testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Is-
sues, U.S. General Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d011171t.pdf (detailing four options for assigning screening responsibility to other 
entities); Mike Fish, Airport Security Debate Focuses on Government’s Role, CNN.COM, 
www.cnn.com/specials/2001/trade.center/flight.risk/stories/part4.mainbar.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (“Even the lawmakers in Washington can’t agree on 
whether the federal government should assume complete control of airport security 
screeners.”). 
 87 ATSA § 110(b) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a)–(g) (Supp. II 
2002)).  See David T. Norton, Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 
1107, 1117–19 (2002) (noting disagreements among House and Senate bills and the 
compromise made in federal oversight of passenger screening). 
 88 ATSA § 108(a) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44920 (Supp. II 2002)); see 
also Norton, supra note 87, at 1119–20.  The two-year period commenced after the 
TSA certified that federal screeners are in place “at all airports in the United States 
where screening is required.”  ATSA § 110(c)(1), 115 Stat. at 616.  The period ex-
pired on November 19, 2004.  See Norton, supra note 87, at 1119.  TSA has extended 
the PP5 program to September, 2005.  Telephone interview with Deirdre O’Sullivan, 
TSA Office of Public Affairs (July 8, 2005) [hereinafter O’Sullivan Interview]. 
 89 See ATSA § 108(a) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44919 (Supp. II 2002)).  
The five airports are San Francisco, California; Kansas City, Kansas; Rochester, New 
York; Tupelo, Mississippi; and Jackson Hole, Wyoming.  See TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE ON SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 4 (2004), available at http:// 
www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/SPP_OptOut_Guidance_6.21.04.pdf. 
 90 See A Review of the Airport Screener Privatization Pilot Program: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 
17–20 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of David M. Stone, Acting Administrator, TSA), 
available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/04-22-04/108-61.pdf. 
 91 See TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE SCREENING OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION REPORT 1–3 (2004) (detailing the findings of a study in security effec-
tiveness, customer and “stakeholder” [air carrier and airport] impact, and costs), 
available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Summary_Report.pdf. 
 92 See GUIDANCE ON SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM, supra note 89, at 6. 
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gers and operators was an important factor in the initial study, TSA 
officials sought to provide assurance that the program’s main focus 
continues to be security assurance. 
[S]ecurity has been and will remain our top priority.  The utiliza-
tion of private contractors in the PP5 program did not lead to a 
rollback of security or to a reversion to the type of screening op-
erations that were conducted prior to the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks.  We managed the PP5 program with security first and fore-
most on our minds and in keeping with the requirements of 
ATSA, and security will remain our most important consideration 
as we move forward on implementing the Screening Partnership 
Program.93 
Despite this assurance, TSA’s own guidance for private contractors 
continues to stress customer service and management efficiency 
equally with security as criteria for selection,94 although the ATSA 
mandates only “the level of screening services and protection” as the 
sole standard for private companies.95  This result is in accord with 
regulatory theories suggesting that, where efficiency is not the sole 
goal, government intervention may be permanently necessary. 
The failure of the pre-September 11 approach was that the dele-
gation to the airlines did not adequately account for safety as a 
regulatory goal, either because the airlines did not recognize 
safety as a factor that should be fully internalized or devoted in-
sufficient care to protecting safety.  In retrospect, this lack of rec-
ognition is not completely surprising: although efficiency in a 
broad sense includes safety, matters such as health and safety are 
sometimes viewed from a regulatory standpoint as going beyond 
efficiency.96 
The Screening Partnership Program seeks to maintain just such a 
strong federal presence while permitting private control.  It allows 
airports to apply to have screening done by private companies, but it 
must be done only by a list of TSA-approved “Qualified Vendors” who 
 
 93 Security Screening Options for Airports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the 
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. 1 (June 24, 2004) 
(statement of Thomas Blank, Assistant Administrator for Transportation Security 
Policy, Transportation Security Administration), available at http://commerce. 
senate.gov/pdf/blank062404.pdf. 
 94 See TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., SCREENING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CONTRACTING 
APPROACH 9–10, available at http://www.tsa.gov/public/interweb/assetlibrary/QVL_ 
SPP.pdf (factors for “Technical Merit” listed as security, customer service, and sup-
ply/subcontractor management). 
 95 See 49 U.S.C. § 44920(d)(1) (Supp. II 2002) (as amended by ATSA § 108(a)). 
 96 Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 348. 
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operate under contract with TSA directly.97  In addition, there re-
mains at each airport a Federal Security Manager with overall respon-
sibility for screening.98  This suggests that Congress was unwilling to 
surrender very much control to the private screeners.  This sentiment 
is echoed for the moment by the airports, as the response to the 
Screening Partnership Program has been lukewarm.99 
The response to the September 11 hijackings shows that Con-
gress, motivated to act quickly and decisively, responded by a com-
plete, though perhaps temporary retreat to federal control.100  Al-
though the hijackings themselves did not create a systemic crisis, the 
nearly palpable public fear of flying on a commercial airliner in the 
United States, exacerbating the airlines critical financial conditions, 
did create such a crisis. 
[T]he September 11 attacks introduced a unique characteristic 
through the fear factor that directly impacts the future develop-
ment of air transport.  As a result, the grim task of restoring pas-
senger confidence stands in the way of the economic revival of the 
air transport industry.101 
To deal with the “fear factor,” direct federal control was required 
over the problem areas of passenger and baggage screening.102  The 
 
 97 See 49 U.S.C. § 44920(a) (Supp. II 2002) (added by ATSA § 108(a)).  A list of 
thirty-four Qualified Vendors was approved by TSA on July 28, 2005.  See  Transporta-
tion Security Administration, TSA’s Qualified Vendors List (QVL), http://www.tsa. 
gov/public/interweb/assetlibrary/Qualified_Vendors.doc (last visited Apr. 26, 
2006); see also Transportation Security Administration, Business Opportunities: 
Screening Partnership Program (Apr. 26, 2006), http://www.tsa.gov/public/ 
interapp/asset_summary/asset_summary_multi_image_0036.xml. 
 98 See 49 U.S.C. § 44933 (Supp. II 2002) (added by ATSA § 103). 
 99 In addition to the five pilot airports in the PP5 program, only two other air-
ports—Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and Ely, Nevada, signed up to participate in the 
Screening Partnership Program, and the White House has remained “neutral” on the 
use of private screeners.  O’Sullivan Interview, supra note 88.  Only the Sioux Falls 
application has proceeded to completion.  See Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., 
Covenant/Lockheed Team Selected as Private Screening Contractor at Sioux Falls 
(Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.tsa.gov/public/interweb/assetlibrary/Sioux_Falls_SPP_ 
12-16-05.doc. 
 100 See Tara Branum & Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and Bailouts: Aviation 
and the Return of Big Government, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 431, 459 (2002) (“With many 
Americans still afraid to fly, the rhetoric took hold, and the proponents of federaliza-
tion pushed the bill through Congress and onto the President’s desk.”). 
 101 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Crisis Management Toward Restoring Confidence in Air 
Transport—Legal and Commercial Issues, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 595, 595 (2002). 
 102 See Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation Security Administration in Historical 
Context, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 233, 247–51 (2003) (discussing passenger and cargo 
screening as part of massive government efforts “to restore confidence”); Donald J. 
Carty, William Coleman, Jr. & John J. Nance, The Future of Air Travel: Three to Five 
Years Ahead, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 765, 781 (2003) (roundtable discussion, remarks of 
MICHAEL FINAL 5/25/2006  12:18:08 PM 
1096 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1075 
need for clear federal control, however, has been balanced by con-
gressional mandate with reliance on private industry, although that 
reliance outside of official public statements103 remains hesitant at 
best in the light of its perceived continuing failures.104  Furthermore, 
it appears that the post-September 11 emphasis in the airline industry 
is a return to customer satisfaction, which involves less of a focus on 
safety than on service.105  It is likely that continued public constraint 
of the private industry approach may be necessary for the foreseeable 
future.106 
B. Public Accounting Quality Assurance 
It is difficult to determine exactly why there was a crisis in public 
accounting.  It is easy to determine when; its epicenter can be placed 
precisely with the decline and fall of Enron in November and De-
cember of 2001 and WorldCom in June of 2002.107  There were other 
revelations of accounting frauds at various other companies before 
and after these cataclysmic events,108 but it is these two that spurred 
the type of public action characteristic of a crisis response. 
The meteoric collapse of Enron from its first announcement of 
problems in October 2001 to its bankruptcy in December revealed 
problems with the management, to be sure, but the focus quickly 
moved to the complicity of others, particularly Arthur Andersen LLP, 
Enron’s auditors.  Other similar frauds disclosed at the same time be-
gan to create a climate demanding change.  The crowning blow came 
 
Donald J. Carty, former Chairman and CEO of AMR Corporation) (commenting on 
how the federal government’s role should be “[t]aking responsibility for security and 
safety oversight . . . and freeing up the market as much as [possible]”). 
 103 See supra text accompanying note 93 (statement of TSA official). 
 104 Niles, supra note 20, at 413. 
 105 Abeyratne, supra note 73, notes that before September 11, the industry “was al-
ready affected by unsustainable slot congestion, ineffective management, and uncon-
scionable flight delays, all of which inevitably resulted in some airlines going out of 
business.”  Id. at 4.  The section of the article entitled “Restoring Passenger Confi-
dence” is about service-based competition rather than safety concerns.  Id. at 4–26. 
 106 See Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 337 (indicating that government safeguarding 
of non-efficiency-based goals will be necessary when relying on private regulation). 
 107 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Re-
form (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 924–25 (2003); HAROLD S. 
BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1, at 3 (2002). 
 108 See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 937 (prior frauds); William W. Bratton, En-
ron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
1023 & n.2 (2003) (prior frauds); Miriam Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transpar-
ency or Congressional Window-Dressing?  The Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley as a Means to 
Avoid Another Corporate Debacle: The Failed Attempt to Revive Meaningful Regulatory Over-
sight, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 98, 100 & n.8 (2004) (prior and subsequent frauds). 
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with WorldCom’s “confession” on June 25, 2002 of a $3.8 billion 
fraud which, unlike Enron’s, was an astonishingly simple and old 
ruse,109 again over the unqualified opinion of its auditor, Arthur An-
dersen.  Adding fuel to the flames was the agonizing sell-off in the 
stock markets which began in March 2000 and would ultimately drain 
over $8 trillion of wealth from the nation’s investors.110  The decline 
was attributed in part to the management and auditing failures.111 
Corporations have imploded in fraud and stock market bubbles 
have burst many times before without creating a crisis.  However, the 
unprecedented speed and magnitude of the declines led many to 
conclude broadly that the financial information which fueled the 
country’s stock markets and investments was or was becoming com-
pletely unreliable.112  Consider the following contemporary account of 
reaction to the events: 
 
 109 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 107, § 6, at 12 (“The [WorldCom] announcement 
staggered the financial world because of the size of the overstatement and the sim-
plicity of the fraud classifying apparent operating expenses as capital expendi-
tures.”). 
 110 Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002) (“From March, 2000 through Septem-
ber 30, 2002, the U.S. stock markets lost half of their market capitalizations, reducing 
investors’ net worth by almost $8.5 trillion.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A1 (observing that “the scandals at Tyco, Adelphia 
and WorldCom, and the perception that the fall in the stock market stemmed from a 
loss of investor confidence, made it increasingly risky for any politician to object” to 
proposed reforms).  See also Brian Kim, Recent Development, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 235 (2003) (citing congressional testimony from, among 
others, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and the observation that 
“[t]he disclosures [by Enron and others] shook the public’s confidence and contrib-
uted to a sharp decline in the stock market”).  Consider, however, the following re-
porter’s “confession”: 
I was occasionally assigned to write the daily dollar or stock market sto-
ries . . . to find out where the dollar finished against other major cur-
rencies, or to ascertain why the Dow Jones Industrial Average moved 
up or down.  I was always amazed that whichever way the markets 
moved, whether the dollar fell or rose, some analyst always had a pithy 
one-liner explaining why $1.2 trillion in transactions on six different 
continents across twenty-four different time zones resulted in the dollar 
falling or rising against the Japanese yen by half a penny.  And we all 
believed this explanation. 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 14 (1999). 
 112 See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 927 (“The upshot was the wholesale ques-
tioning of the quality of financial reporting throughout corporate America.”); Brat-
ton, supra note 108, at 1023 (“The stock market awakened in 2002 to discover that it 
no longer had numbers it could trust.”); Aronson, supra note 110, at 127 (“Shaken to 
the core [by the September 11 terrorist attacks and the series of accounting scan-
dals], many American investors, who had enjoyed one of the great bull markets of all 
times, came to a number of numbing conclusions.  First, internal and external audit-
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[T]he country is beginning to reappraise the celebration of free-
market forces that marked the 1990s.  And early political tremors 
of public opinion hint at greater fallout to come. 
 . . . . 
 Political momentum to restrain government regulation is wan-
ing.  As they await the government’s response to a wave of busi-
ness scandals, six in 10 Americans say they are worried regulators 
won’t go far enough.113 
Thus a global, existential, unprecedented threat, or “crisis,” was 
born.114  Uncertainty and risk change the calculus in the financial 
markets.  Perceptions matter because “[t]he foreboding could be-
come self-fulfilling, if it paralyzes people and companies. . . . 
[G]enuine risk is an unsettling concept.”115  Risk is not normally ex-
pected from audits, as audits are intended to reduce risk and increase 
uniformity—“the potential loss of confidence in our accounting firms 
and the audit process is a burden our capital markets cannot and 
should not bear.”116 
Although the crisis was new, the subject was not.  The state of 
public company financial accounting regulation in the United States 
in early 2002 was similar to that of aviation safety as previously de-
scribed, namely, federal oversight with private entity first-line respon-
sibility.  Upon passage of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934, 
the idea of having government employees audit public company fi-
nancial statements was discussed, but dismissed as impractical.117  The 
 
ing systems had failed.”); BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 107, § 1, at 3 (“The demise of 
Enron was part of a much broader picture that contributed to widespread question-
ing by investors of the integrity of our capital markets.”). 
 113 Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Rising Anxiety: What Could Bring a 1930s-Style 
Reform of U.S. Businesses?  A Severe Economic Downturn that Gives One Party Control, a 
Clear Mandate—So Far, Anger, Not Desperation, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at A1. 
 114 Recall the definition of a crisis, supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.  See 
Shailagh Murray & Michael Schroeder, House and Senate Leaders Endorse Major Changes 
in Accounting Rules, WALL ST. J., July 25 2002, at A3 (“The legislative package, aimed 
at tightening oversight of accountants, revamping securities law and imposing 
tougher penalties for corporate fraud after disclosures of irregularities at companies 
such as Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc., culminates weeks of debate that took on 
new urgency with the recent stock-market meltdown.”).  For a listing of companies 
whose business practices have been questioned, see BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 107, 
app. E, at 1. 
 115 Robert J. Samuelson, The Erosion of Confidence, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002, at 45. 
 116 Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Public 
Statement by SEC Chairman: Regulation of the Accounting Profession (Jan. 17, 
2002),  available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch535.htm. 
 117 See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD. PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ 1.4 (2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/ 
download.html (follow “1. Introduction” hyperlink) (“Whether audits should be per-
formed in the private sector or by government auditors was debated during the Sen-
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Penn Central crisis in 1972 brought unsuccessful calls for federal 
regulation of auditors.118  There were reforms a few years later, 
prompted by the investigations of illegal foreign payments by U.S. 
companies.119  And the idea of federal regulation surfaced again in 
the late 1980s, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
considered requiring “peer reviews” of auditors of public companies.  
The SEC settled instead for a supervised private arrangement.120  
Every auditor of public companies121 was required to become a mem-
ber of an industry trade group with peer reviews by accounting firms 
of each others’ audits.122  A separate independent group, the Public 
Oversight Board (“POB”), was given the task of evaluating the peer 
review process itself.  In the 1990s, other reform efforts focused on 
improving the independence of auditors from their clients with the 
creation of the Independence Standards Board, whose work was later 
assumed by the SEC.123 
With the crisis of 2001–02, however, came a new and very visible 
federal response. Upon the announcement of the WorldCom fraud, 
the SEC ordered nearly one thousand public companies to immedi-
 
ate hearings that preceded the Securities Act of 1933, and the resulting decision to 
rely on the private sector has not been challenged seriously in the intervening seven 
decades.”). 
 118 See Weismann, supra note 108, at 110. 
 119 See Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through 
Improvement of Oversight of the Auditing Process, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964, 44,970 
(proposed July 5, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229) [hereinafter SEC 
Auditor Oversight Proposal]. 
 120 See generally Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a 
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 214–17 (1995) (discussing SEC efforts to 
create mandatory peer review). 
 121 In this context, “public company” typically means an issuer of securities regis-
tered under § 12 or who is required to file reports under § 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 
2(a)(7), 116 Stat. 745, 747 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (defining a public company as an “issuer” subject to the Act).  The SEC’s 
peer review proposal would have reached more broadly, applying instead to account-
ants, not issuers, and would have covered any accountant certifying reports filed un-
der the federal securities laws.  See Independent Accountants; Mandatory Peer Re-
view, 52 Fed. Reg. 11,665, 11,666 (proposed Apr. 10, 1987) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 210, 239, 240, 279). 
 122 That trade group is the SEC Practice Section (“SECPS”) of the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants.  Nearly all firms auditing public companies are 
members of the SECPS.  See Michael, supra note 120, at 215 n. 281. 
 123 See generally Commission Policy Statement on the Establishment and Improve-
ment of Standards Related to Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No. 
7993, Exchange Act Release No. 44,557, Investment Company Act Release No. 
25,066, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,149, 38,150–51 (July 23, 2001) (chronicling the relationship 
with the Independence Standards Board, beginning in 1998 and ending in 2001). 
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ately certify the accuracy of their financial reports.124  The Commis-
sion noted: 
 In light of recent reports of accounting irregularities at public 
companies, including some large and seemingly well-regarded 
companies, the purpose of the Commission’s investigation is to 
provide greater assurance to the Commission and to investors that 
persons have not violated, or are not currently violating, the pro-
visions of the federal securities laws governing corporate issuers’ 
financial reporting and accounting practices . . . .125 
It seems that the Commission, “so much taken aback”126 by the stun-
ning frauds culminating with WorldCom, acted in a manner analo-
gous to the FAA’s grounding of airplanes on September 11, to pro-
vide a baseline of assurance and to calm investors.  The relatively 
strong and immediate federal presence is consistent with the kinds of 
reaction necessary to assuage fear and create the appearance of con-
trol and confidence. 
In a further effort to strengthen federal oversight of public au-
diting, the Commission proposed a new independent board to over-
see peer reviews.127  Faced with this lack of support and having earlier 
been stripped of major funding, the POB voted to dissolve.128  The 
SEC’s proposal, in turn, is widely considered to have been intended 
to create an incentive for Congress to act, as an accounting reform 
bill had passed the House but was appearing to stall in the Senate.129  
The WorldCom revelations supplied additional pressure,130 and the 
 
 124 See File No. 4-460: Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to 
Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (June 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm. 
 125 Id. 
 126 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 107, § 7, at 15. 
 127 See generally SEC Auditor Oversight Proposal, supra note 119. 
 128 See PUB. OVERSIGHT BD., FINAL ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 2–3, http://www. 
publicoversightboard.org/2001.pdf. 
 129 See Michael Schroeder & Tom Hamburger, Accounting Reform Gets Big Lift as 
Senate Panel Backs New Board, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2002, at A1. 
The drive for an overhaul of the industry seemed to lose steam after 
public outrage peaked over Enron earlier this year.  The House in 
April passed an industry-backed bill that punted the most difficult deci-
sions about how tough to be to the SEC . . . . 
     . . . The SEC plan prompted Senate Republicans to cave in to De-
mocratic demands for a tough measure, reviving a bill that had been 
written off as dead. 
Id. 
 130 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 107, § 9, at 20 (explaining that the WorldCom reve-
lation “sealed the Congressional fate of financial fraud reform legislation”); Kim, su-
pra note 111, at 240–41 (“The political climate changed dramatically when the suc-
cession of scandals burst into the media coverage.”).  See generally Larry E. Ribstein, 
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resulting Sarbanes-Oxley Act131 was passed by both Houses, and 
signed into law on July 30, 2002.132 
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made wide-ranging changes,133 
most were codifications of current practice or modest changes in 
corporate law.  Truly dramatic changes, however, were made to the 
auditing and accounting standard setters and regulators.134  The Act 
created a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) and requires it to inspect the firms auditing public cor-
porations.135  In addition, the Act mandates that the PCAOB set audit-
ing standards.136  The Act also moves the funding of the current ac-
counting standard-setter, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”), from a private industry group endowment to a fee levied 
on public companies.137  The PCAOB was given the discretion by the 
Act to continue the present arrangement regarding auditing stan-
dards, that is, reliance on the American Institute of Certified Public 
 
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46–47 (2002) (explaining how the public’s perception was in-
fluenced by the frauds coupled with well-timed insider sales, by judgment biases that 
overestimated risks in a falling stock market, by the “availability heuristic” that exag-
gerated risks because of media coverage, and the “cascade effects” and “reputation 
effects” that made it politically impossible not to join the calls for reform). 
 131 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 132 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec., President Bush Signs Cor-
porate Corruption Bill, (July 30, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/07/20020730.html. 
 133 Bloomenthal calls it “a securities regulation smorgasboard.”  BLOOMENTHAL, 
supra note 107, § 10, at 21. 
 134 See Cunningham, supra note 107, at 977 (characterizing “restructuring and re-
funding of auditing and accounting standard setters” as a “silver bullet” and the 
other changes as relatively minor in scope and effect); Donna M. Nagy, Playing 
Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 975, 1007 (2005) (“[T]he PCAOB [the new accounting board discussed 
infra at notes 135–46 and accompanying text] constitutes a radical change to the ac-
counting profession’s former system of self-regulation.”). 
 135 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101–05, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–16 (Supp. II 2002). 
 136 Id. § 103, 15 U.S.C. § 7213.  The PCAOB has the authority to adopt existing 
standards as “initial and transitional” standards.  Id. § 103(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C.  
§ 7213(a)(3)(B). 
 137 Id. § 109(e), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(e).  The FASB is not mentioned by name as the 
standard setting body, but this was clearly Congress’ intent.  SENATE COMM. ON 
BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING REFORM AND 
INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 13 (2002) (“The bill seeks 
to formalize the SEC’s reliance on the FASB . . . .”).  The SEC has in fact so recog-
nized the FASB.  Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB 
as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, Ex-
change Act Release No. 47,743, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,028, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 23,333 (May 1, 2003). 
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Accountants’ Auditing Standards Board.138  The PCAOB declined this 
invitation,139 and although the pre-Act standards have been adopted 
on a transitional basis,140 the PCAOB has made clear its intent to re-
view every existing standard and change them where necessary.141 
None of the reforms proposed in the wake of the En-
ron/WorldCom revelations had suggested replacing the private ac-
counting profession with a federal staff, as was done with the airline 
baggage inspectors.142  Nonetheless, the private arrangement consist-
ing of the private board was replaced, not with a government 
agency,143 but one nonetheless under tight government control.144  
And, importantly, the PCAOB was not a preexisting private sector ar-
rangement blessed by Congress, but a private entity created for solely 
 
 138 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(3) (Supp. II 
2002).  For a description of the pre-Act arrangement of de facto deference to the Au-
diting Standards Board, see Nagy, supra note 134, at 989–91, and Cunningham, supra 
note 107, at 943. 
 139 “The Board has decided not to exercise its authority under Section 
103(a)(3)(A) to designate a group . . . as a source of auditing standards.  Absent fu-
ture Board action, no . . . group will have any special ability to submit proposed [au-
diting] standards to the Board.” Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Release No. 
2003-005, Statement Regarding the Establishment of Auditing and Other Profes-
sional Standards, at 14 (Apr. 18, 2003), available at http://www.pcaob.org/rules/ 
docket_004/2003-04-18_release_2003-005.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2003-
005]. 
 140 See Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Release No. 2003-006, Establishment of 
Interim Professional Auditing Standards, at 5–6 (Apr. 18, 2003), available at http:// 
www.pcaob.org/rules/Interim_Standards/Release2003-006.pdf. 
 141 PCAOB Release No. 2003-005, supra note 139, at 10 (“[T]he Board will estab-
lish a schedule for the review of all Interim Professional Auditing Standards.  The 
Board intends to commence this review as soon as possible.  The objective of the re-
view will be to determine, on a standard-by-standard basis, whether the Interim Pro-
fessional Auditing Standards should become permanent standards of the Board, be 
repealed, or be modified.”); see also Nagy, supra note 134, at 992 & n.79. 
 142 One proposed amendment to the House version of the bill would have created 
a “Federal Bureau of Audits” within the SEC to perform the audits of financial state-
ments required under the securities laws.  148 CONG. REC. H1537, 1567 (daily ed., 
Apr. 24, 2002).  The sponsors of this amendment likened the federal audit corps to 
the FBI, id. at H1571 (remarks of Rep. Kucinich), and the federal bank examiners, 
id. at H1573 (remarks of Rep. LaFalce).  The amendment failed by a vote of thirty-
nine to 381.  Id. at H1573–74. 
 143 The PCAOB is not a government agency, but a District of Columbia nonprofit 
corporation.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (Supp. II 
2002). 
 144 The PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC, and its budget and all its 
rules and decisions must be approved by the SEC as well.  Id. §§ 101–07, 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 7211–7217 (Supp. II 2002) (appointment, budget, rule and order appeal).  Fi-
nally, the SEC may censure and remove Board members.  Id. § 107(d), 15 U.S.C. § 
7217(d) (Supp. II 2002)).  For the constitutional law implications of this odd “hy-
brid” arrangement, see generally Nagy, supra note 134, at 1029–60. 
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public purposes.145  The combination of the SEC’s initial immediate 
certification of financial statements and Congress’s creation of a new 
board with centralized control and authority shows a paradigmatic 
crisis response.  Will there be a return to reliance on private groups?  
As stated above, the PCAOB’s initial indication is that it does not in-
tend to return auditing standards to private control.  However, the 
prognosis for the PCAOB’s exercise of active, vigorous control re-
mains mixed.146 
III. CRISES PAST 
This Part discusses historical comparisons to the events of 2001–
02 from two very different places and times.  First, I discuss the meat 
and poultry industry and the crisis faced approximately a century ago.  
Then, I discuss the bank and thrift industry during crises in the Great 
Depression and in the late 1980s. 
A. Meat and Poultry Processing 
It is widely recognized that the publication of Upton Sinclair’s 
novel, The Jungle, in February 1906 precipitated a crisis of sorts in the 
American meat packing industry. 
Millions of Americans were sickened by Sinclair’s vivid descrip-
tions of the abominably filthy conditions in American meat proc-
essing. 
. . . [T]he novel galvanized public support behind the idea for 
pure food and drug and meat inspection legislation. . . . [T]he 
federal government, prodded by Sinclair’s exposé, assumed the 
responsibility for ensuring sanitary production of food prod-
ucts.147 
 
 145 It is in this respect that the PCAOB differs markedly from any self-regulatory 
organization or government corporation which came before it.  Nagy, supra note 134, 
at 1022–29. 
 146 Compare Bratton, supra note 108, at 1026–27, 1032 (contending that supervised 
self-regulation will be an efficient model so long as the supervisor—here, the 
PCAOB—avoids “capture” by the industry), with Weismann, supra note 108, at 126–
27 (criticizing the continued reliance on private advisory groups, concluding that 
“the PCAOB emerges as a weak rule-making authority rather than a proactive super-
visory agent of the SEC” and that the PCAOB “believes it can regulate standards but 
not morality, which is considered to be the key to infusing investor confidence in the 
marketplace”). 
 147 James R. Barrett, Introduction to UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE xi, xii–xiii (Univ. 
of Ill. Press 1988) (1906). 
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Although the campaign for pure food and drug laws had been build-
ing since the 1880s,148 the stark revelation of the conditions in the 
packing houses had an immediate, paralyzing impact on the beef 
processing industry in the United States.  Demand for meat dropped 
by half or more following the publication of Sinclair’s book:149 
 Meat outlets felt immediate effects.  Trade in lard, sausage, and 
canned goods came almost to a standstill.  Hundreds of consum-
ers who usually bought steaks and chops contented themselves 
with fresh fruits and vegetables.  Restaurants reported a vast de-
cline in business.150 
It was largely Sinclair’s work that created the atmosphere necessary 
for the ultimate success of the movement.151  His book was read care-
fully by President Roosevelt, who ordered his own separate inspection 
of the packing houses.152  He threatened to release the results of this 
study to the public unless Congress acted swiftly and forcefully on the 
question,153 and he actively helped broker a compromise.154  The re-
 
 148 Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 
31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 79 (2000) (“Congress prohibited food adulteration in the 
District of Columbia in 1879, but it took nearly thirty more years and the defeat of 
190 bills before legislation was passed to prohibit the marketing of adulterated food 
in interstate commerce.”).  For a history of food and drug reforms in the decade 
preceding Sinclair’s novel, see OSCAR E. ANDERSON, JR., THE HEALTH OF A NATION: 
HARVEY W. WILEY AND THE FIGHT FOR PURE FOOD 120–96 (1958). 
 149 See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS 
ACT OF 1906, at 231 (1989); STEPHEN WILSON, FOOD & DRUG REGULATION 37 (1942). 
 150 LORINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN, THE PURE FOOD, DRINK, AND DRUG CRUSADERS, 
1879–1914, at 252 (1999). 
 151 See JIMMY M. SKAGGS, PRIME CUT: LIVESTOCK RAISING AND MEATPACKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1607–1983, at 123 (1986) (“While it has become fashionable among 
some revisionist historians to denigrate and superciliously dismiss ‘the twelfth-hour 
impact of . . . The Jungle,’ the sensational book unquestionably riveted public atten-
tion on the appalling conditions in meatpacking.”). 
 152 See GOODWIN, supra note 150, at 250–51, YOUNG, supra note 149, at 231–35, 
WILSON, supra note 149, at 36–37. 
 153 See GOODWIN, supra note 150, at 251; YOUNG, supra note 149, at 235–36 (“[Roo-
sevelt] had begun to consider the threat of announcing to the nation the . . . discov-
eries as a valuable club to hold over the heads of packers to get them to acquiesce in 
a remedial law.”).  Ultimately, the President had to make good on his threat.  The as-
sessment of the impact of the release of the report is mixed.  Compare GOODWIN, su-
pra note 150, at 250 (“The [release of the] report touched off a meat scandal of un-
precedented proportions.”), with YOUNG, supra note 149, at 241 (“The . . . report 
struck both public and Congress as somewhat déjà vu.  It made no new revelations 
and cited no incidents of dead workers contaminating the food supply [as a famous 
passage from The Jungle had done].  Nevertheless, the report’s straightforward prose, 
describing what the two social workers had seen, even after frantic efforts by packing 
companies to clean up, had a sobering impact.”). 
 154 YOUNG, supra note 149, at 246 (“[T]he president stood at the center of the 
compromising efforts to fashion a meat-inspection bill that both Senate and House 
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sulting legislation was the predecessor to the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act,155 and was passed only four months after publication of Sinclair’s 
work.156 
A largely voluntary inspection system was replaced with pervasive 
direct federal control.  Federal inspection was considered a key part 
of restoring consumer confidence.157  The first act required, and the 
law still requires,158 a federal employee to inspect and approve, by a 
label or stamp, each animal and meat or poultry product sold in in-
terstate commerce.159 
 
would accept.  His Cuban experiences [with tainted meat served to armed forces in 
the Spanish-American War], his continuing legal involvements with the beef trust, his 
moral judgments, the degree of public agitation, all impelled Roosevelt to desire 
prompt enactment of such a law.”). 
 155 See ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 674 (1906) (enacting the first federal meat inspection act 
as part of the Department of Agriculture appropriation act).  YOUNG, supra note 149, 
at 237 (attachment of bill to the Agricultural Appropriation Act); id. at 251 (signa-
ture of the Act by President Roosevelt).  A brief provision addressing adulterated 
meat was enacted as part of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 
768, 770 (1906) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1–13 and repealed by the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 7, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (1906) (repealed 
1938)).  A second appropriation for the Department of Agriculture for meat inspec-
tion was passed the following year, Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1256, 1260–
65 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–24 (2000)), which was later recodified 
and titled the Federal Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, § 1, 81 Stat. 584 
(1967).  The 1967 Act officially applied the standards of the 1907 Act to intrastate 
packing, which by the early 1960s had been found to be reminiscent of Sinclair’s re-
ported conditions.  Federal Meat Inspection Act § 3; see also SKAGGS, supra note 151, 
at 209–10.  Poultry was added in the Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. 
No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C §§ 451–469 
(2000)). 
 156 YOUNG, supra note 149, at 229–51; ANDERSON, supra note 148, at 188–94 
(chronicling events from The Jungle’s publication in February to the passage of the 
Department of Agriculture appropriation act and the Pure Food and Drug Act on 
June 30, 1906).  Sinclair’s book also indirectly spurred rapid consideration and pas-
sage of the Pure Food and Drug Act; see PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG 
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (1980) (“Public outrage over The Jungle was 
used by advocates of general legislation on adulteration to secure passage of their 
act, even though it did not refer to and was separate from a bill on the inspection of 
meat packing.”). 
 157 WILSON, supra note 149, at 37 (“[T]he packers favored government inspection 
as the only means of restoring public confidence.”).  The only real question was 
whether the inspectors would be paid by the packers or by the taxpayers (the latter 
were ultimately tagged with the costs).  YOUNG, supra note 149, at 248–50. 
 158 See Merrill & Francer, supra note 148, at 79 (“The [Meat Inspection Act of 
1906] established the program of continuous examination by resident federal inspec-
tors in meat processing facilities that persists to this day.”). 
 159 For the current version, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 455, 604 (2000) (poultry and poultry 
products, animal carcasses, and meat products, respectively).  The stamps and marks 
are depicted and explained at U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and In-
spection Source, Inspection and Grading – What’s the Difference?, http://www.fsis. 
usda.gov/Fact_Sheets/Inspection_&_Grading/index.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).  
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As the industry and government regulation developed, the worst 
abuses were curbed, to be sure,160 but federal meat inspectors re-
mained at the focal point of the federal quality assurance program.161  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Department of Agriculture’s 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) experimented with su-
pervised self-regulation in both meat packing and meat processing, 
but with limited success.162  In addition, the focus of meat and poultry 
processing problems was being drawn more to microscopic patho-
gens, against which the traditional visual inspections were a poor 
safeguard.163  In 1996, FSIS directed meat and poultry processors to 
supplement the federal inspection with a type of process regulation 
known as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (“HACCP”) 
regulation.164  HACCP represents a shift from traditional “command-
and-control” regulation to process regulation through performance 
standards, rather than product regulation through traditional or-
ganoleptic inspection. 
 
The modern impact of the inspection stamp is unclear.  Compare James A. Albert, A 
History of Attempts by the Department of Agriculture to Reduce Federal Inspection of Poultry 
Processing Plants—A Return to the Jungle, 51 LA. L. REV. 1183, 1191 (1991) (“Consumer 
confidence is absolutely essential to the food processing industry. . . . The USDA la-
bel on poultry products signifies to the public that the food has been prepared in a 
sanitary plant under federal government inspection, that it meets government stan-
dards for wholesomeness, and that it is safe to eat.”), with id. at 1228 (noting criticism 
of reliability of poultry inspections), Roger Roots, A Muckracker’s Aftermath: The Jun-
gle of Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2426 
(2001) (“The sad reality is that federal meat inspection laws have never been seri-
ously designed to do anything other than placate the public’s post-Jungle fears of 
meat contamination.”), and Dion Casey, Student Article, Agency Capture: The USDA’s 
Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1998, at 142, 148 
(noting current unreliability of USDA stamp of approval because of inspectors’ fail-
ure to detect microbial pathogens). 
 160 See, e.g., SKAGGS, supra note 151, at 215 (noting U.S. and foreign meat packing 
standards); Merrill & Francer, supra note 148, at 68 (“Government officials regularly 
claim that the U.S. food supply is the safest in the world, a claim we have no basis for 
disputing.” (footnote omitted)). 
 161 See SKAGGS, supra note 151, at 210–11 (noting that inspectors are overworked 
and pressured to approve diseased or spoiled meat). 
 162 See generally Michael, supra note 29, at 562–70 (meat processing reforms); Al-
bert, supra note 159, at 1186–93 (poultry processing regulation reforms). 
 163 Food Safety and Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Pathogen 
Reduction and HACCP Systems . . . and Beyond (1998), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/ 
oa/background/bkbeyond.htm; Fortin, supra note 32, at 567–69 (discussing limita-
tions of traditional inspection and advantages of alternative methods). 
 164 Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Sys-
tems, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806 (July 25, 1996) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 304, 308, 
310, 320, 327, 381, 416, 417).  The principal HACCP Rule is at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417 
(2006). 
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 Under the command-and-control-based system, the inspector 
assumed responsibility for “approving” production-associated de-
cisions.  Under the new system, industry assumes full responsibil-
ity for production decisions and execution.  FSIS, having set food 
safety standards, monitors establishments’ compliance with those 
standards and related requirements and under HACCP, verifies 
process control and pathogen reduction and control.165 
The conceptual shift is important.  Rather than focusing on the 
products, “HACCP provides process control to prevent food safety 
problems before they happen.”166  HACCP was developed in response 
to scientific advances in the understanding of food safety167 and, in 
some cases, the industry’s increases in capacity.168  This dramatic 
change169 developed over several years, but like the original 1906 act, 
was precipitated by crisis.  In this case, the crisis was a 1993 outbreak 
of E. coli poisoning in the northwest United States traced to ham-
burgers eaten at Jack-in-the-Box restaurants.170  HACCP has been rec-
ognized as beneficial for food processing generally, and has been 
adopted by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for process-
ing in several specific food industries,171 with a pilot program investi-
gating the utility of the HACCP approach for regulation of food sup-
ply safety generally.172 
Reviews since HACCP’s implementation for meat and poultry, 
animals, and products have been mixed.  HACCP has not prevented 
 
 165 Id., 61 Fed. Reg. at 38,808. 
 166 Fortin, supra note 32, at 566. 
 167 See id. at 566–67 (noting that HACCP’s origins were in preparing food for the 
space program, where any sicknesses could be catastrophic). 
 168 See Albert, supra note 159, at 1186. 
 169 Margaret O’K. Glavin, HACCP: We’ve Only Just Begun, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 137, 
137 (2001) (favorably comparing the publication of The Jungle and the 1906 Act with 
“another such revolution,” namely, the mandating of HACCP by the FSIS). 
 170 Fortin, supra note 32, at 579; Casey, supra note 159, at 148; Caroline Smith 
DeWaal, Delivering on HACCP’s Promise to Improve Food Safety: A Comparison of Three 
HACCP Regulations, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 331, 331 (1997). 
 171 Specific FDA initiatives to date include HACCP regulations for seafood, fruit 
juice, and a pilot program for dairy products.  Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary 
Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,096 (Dec. 18, 
1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 123, 1240); Hazard Analysis and Critical Con-
trol Point (HACCP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing 
of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6138 (Jan. 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 120); U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Dairy 
Grade A Voluntary HACCP, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/haccpdai.html (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
 172 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutri-
tion, Other HACCP Activities, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/haccpoth.html# 
land (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
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major outbreaks; indeed, the largest single beef recall ever occurred 
in 1997 at a plant with full HACCP controls.173  In order to be success-
ful, experience has taught that the regulated entities must be faithful 
and complete in their record keeping, which forms the basis for the 
government’s approval of the packer’s process controls.174  They must 
be motivated to fully embrace the HACCP concept.  The motivation 
is supplied in the main by having a HACCP program based in “sound 
science,” that is, one that results in a safer end product.175  There re-
mains a further need for retraining at the agency, which must “rein-
vent” itself from a product regulator to a process regulator.176  And 
most importantly, there needs to be a mechanism to deal with the in-
evitable failure that will result even in the best systems, and to verify 
that the HACCP plan is “scientifically valid, complies with FSIS regu-
lations, and is being fully implemented.”177  Indeed, one of the main 
conceptual problems with the extension of HACCP is that it is mov-
ing from areas where sound programs will result in no failures, to raw 
meat and poultry products, where there will be some acceptable level 
of contamination.178 
HACCP regulations have faced some difficulties in the courts.  
HACCP procedures have been held to be inconsistent with the statu-
tory command for actual direct federal inspection of each animal and 
product.179  In addition, courts have found no statutory basis for 
HACCP’s fundamental scheme of product quality assurance, holding 
that the government in an enforcement action must still show that 
the food product has been adulterated or that the processing is un-
 
 173 Casey, supra note 159, at 154–55. 
 174 Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat Supply, 33 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 445 (1997) (“HACCP depends totally on the meat pro-
ducer’s willingness to report its own noncompliance . . . .”). 
 175 DeWaal, supra note 170, at 332 (concluding that “[w]ithout this motivation, 
HACCP would be little more than a paperwork exercise without significant public 
health impact”). 
 176 Glavin, supra note 169, at 138 (noting that workforce expertise and training 
continue to be problems). 
 177 Id. at 139. 
 178 See DeWaal, supra note 170, at 333 (“Measuring the effectiveness of HACCP on 
raw products is problematic, because it is expected that some pathogenic bacteria 
still will exist on the product.”).  This has been a problem discussed in a recent en-
forcement case, where the packer argued successfully that the meat was contami-
nated prior to entering the plant.  See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 179 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Glickman, 215 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); see also BARRY M. LEVENSON, HABEAS CODFISH: REFLECTIONS ON FOOD AND THE 
LAW 29–30 (2001).  The Court of Appeals later approved of a modified version of the 
program at issue in Glickman.  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO v. Veneman, 
284 F.3d 125, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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sanitary.180  These problems are only statutory, but Congress may be 
reluctant to change the century-old requirement for individual physi-
cal inspection of each animal and product.  Nor is Congress likely to 
require that meat and poultry processors assure the cleanliness of 
each product no matter what its condition on entry to the plant. 
In sum, HACCP is a revolutionary program with revolutionary 
problems.  It is designed to have the regulated entities as partners, 
when to date they have embraced the strong public assurances given 
by direct federal inspection.181  It is designed to use science that tells 
us what will work to eradicate the problem, so that critical control 
points and processes may be designed to eliminate the problem.  It is 
not designed to deal with failures, although they will generate signifi-
cant public attention, and hence political attention.182 
Although we are now one hundred years after the crisis of The 
Jungle, it appears that regulation of meat and poultry processing can 
be characterized by an immediate and strong direct federal regula-
tory presence at the outset, in order to restore public confidence.  
This is done in an industry where confidence is essential to the prod-
uct, and one processor’s errors can affect the entire demand for the 
product.  Later, as the immediate crisis passed, the federal govern-
ment turned to the industry for assistance, in some failed self-
regulatory efforts and now with HACCP, recognizing that involve-
ment by the regulated entities will be necessary for a successful pro-
gram.183 
 
 180 Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the mere presence of salmonella does not violate statute which requires 
meat to be “rendered” adulterated by the processor in order to result in liability), dis-
cussed in Blake B. Johnson, Student Article, The Supreme Beef Case: An Opportunity to 
Rethink Federal Food Safety Regulation, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 159 (2004), and 
LEVENSON, supra note 179, at 26–28. 
 181 See Albert, supra note 159, at 1221 (quoting an official of the American Meat 
Institute: “‘Our members’ businesses depend on maintaining consumer confidence 
in the nation’s meat supply’”); id. at 1222 (noting industry’s opposition to relaxation 
of poultry inspection standards, as the processors “realiz[ed] that the perception of 
tough federal inspection was essential to maintaining consumer confidence”). 
 182 See generally DeWaal, supra note 170, at 332–34 (describing the difficultly im-
plementing HACCP where science has not developed to provide for risk eradication 
but only risk reduction). 
 183 Some critics have alleged that the involvement of the regulated entities is due 
to “agency capture” rather than a demonstrated reliance on the abilities of the regu-
lated entities to understand and comply.  See Fortin, supra note 32, at 582–84 (de-
scribing a “subtle capture” theory as well as the agency’s perspective of its resources 
and roles as reasons for the lack of full and vigorous implementation of HACCP). 
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B. Financial Institutions 
The nation’s financial institutions faced two crises of confidence: 
first, the bank failures in the 1930s and then the savings and loan 
failures in the 1980s.  In addition, the nation’s securities brokers and 
dealers faced a similar problem in the 1960s.  The situations and fed-
eral responses are analyzed below.184 
1. The Banking Crisis of 1933 
The Great Depression resulted in a series of bank failures and 
panics beginning in 1931, resulting ultimately in the collapse of the 
United States banking system by March 1933.  President Hoover’s ini-
tial response to the first bank failures was the creation of the National 
Credit Corporation in 1931, which was broadened and reorganized as 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) in 1932.185  Hoover 
regarded the problem as one of confidence in the banking system 
and relied primarily on the bankers themselves to voluntarily stem 
the tide of bank runs and failures.186  Fundamentally unresponsive, 
the banking system’s series of failures and panics continued until the 
spring of 1933.187 
 
 184 I have not included the New Deal reforms of the securities markets in this dis-
cussion.  It is true that the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression 
also resulted in a crisis of investor confidence.  It is different from the banking crisis 
because there was no immediate, severe, and disabling reaction.  The resulting im-
mediate federal regulation—the Securities Act of 1933, followed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934—came when it did not because of a disabling crisis, but be-
cause of the enormous political opportunity created by the banking crisis.  See JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 52 (1982) (discussing “the 
unique opportunity rapidly to enact (securities) legislation created by the favorable 
public and congressional response to his handling of the bank crisis just after his in-
auguration on March 4.”). 
 185 See ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 109 (1996); 
SUSAN ESTABROOK KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 32–38 (1973). 
 186 See WICKER, supra note 185, at 66 (“The contribution of Hoover’s announce-
ment [of the creation of the NCC] to the restoration of confidence in the banking 
system and to the ending of the panic [in the fall of 1931] has largely been ig-
nored.”); KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 43 (“Hoover and the conservative traditional-
ists believed that if government was to act at all, it had to operate indirectly through 
established institutions to reinvigorate the credit structure.”); Steven A. Ramirez, The 
Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 529 (2003) (“Hoo-
ver’s approach was largely psychological; his aim was to enhance business confi-
dence.  Hoover’s view was that ‘[g]overnment should not coerce, but it could and 
should cajole.’” (footnote omitted)) (quoting WILLIAM J. BARBER, FROM NEW ERA TO 
NEW DEAL: HERBERT HOOVER, THE ECONOMISTS, AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY, 
1921–1933, at 82 (1985)). 
 187 The history is fully chronicled in KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 22–151; see also 
WICKER, supra note 185, at 24–32 (events of 1930), 66–78 (events of 1931), and 116–
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By March 4, 1933, nearly all of the nation’s banks had been 
closed because of bank “runs.”  In a bank run, depositors who believe 
that the bank lacks sufficient liquid assets to pay deposits upon de-
mand seek immediate payment.  As a result, the fear becomes self-
fulfilling as the bank must liquidate assets at “fire sale” prices to meet 
the increasing demand for withdrawals.  Ultimately, a bank facing an 
unrestrained immediate demand for deposit withdrawals will fail, as 
many did.188  The outgoing Hoover administration remained firm in 
its belief that the industry could and should right itself, and there was 
nothing done until President-elect Roosevelt took office. 
 The Hoover administration came late to the support of essential 
banking reform.  As a matter of conviction, the president and his 
advisers clung to the idea that the banking system remained fun-
damentally sound and could cure itself. . . . [H]e waited so long to 
espouse consequential change that the opportunities for passing 
an effective law had narrowed hopelessly.  In the closing days of 
his term, Herbert Hoover faced a daily worsening of the banking 
crisis, armed only with the weapons which had failed him in the 
past. 
 . . . 
 By March 1 [1933], therefore, the old and the new administra-
tions had reached a standstill.  Hoover feared repudiation too 
much to take the risk that his last official act would blot what he 
regarded as an otherwise upright record.  Roosevelt, on the other 
hand, saw no reason to rescue either Hoover or the bankers; their 
salvation would not improve his position and their fall could offer 
him some interesting opportunities.  In the last analysis, however, 
no one—neither Hoover, nor Roosevelt, nor the bankers—
produced a concrete program to correct either the banking or 
the gold panic until it was too late to put such measures into ef-
fect.189 
As President, Roosevelt’s first action was to declare a federal 
“bank holiday,” which was largely moot, as banks had already been 
 
32 (events of 1933).  The definitive history from an economic and monetary perspec-
tive is given in MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 299–420 (1963). 
 188 In 1933 alone, over twenty percent of the country’s banks failed.  WICKER, supra 
note 185, at 2. 
 189 KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 74, 143–44; see also Ramirez, supra note 186, at 529 
(“Hoover did more than any of his predecessors in attacking the calamity at hand.  
He was, however, hopelessly hemmed in by doctrine, tradition, and his own view of 
the role of the federal government.” (footnote omitted)). 
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closed by the governors and legislatures in most states.190  The new 
president took several immediate steps to assume control and provide 
security in the midst of the panic.  His inaugural address on March 4, 
1933, contained the famous “nothing to fear but fear itself” lan-
guage.191  On March 6th, Roosevelt declared the bank holiday; on 
March 9th, Roosevelt called Congress into session to consider emer-
gency banking legislation, which it passed that same day.192  On March 
12th, in the first of what would become his famous “fireside chats,” 
Roosevelt spoke to an estimated sixty million listeners in plain lan-
guage about the banking crisis and how it would be resolved.193  These 
immediate moves by the federal government served to restore confi-
dence in the banking system.194 
Banks began to reopen under federal supervision and, in many 
cases, with federal assistance through the RFC.195  The scope of this 
federal investment is often overlooked.  The RFC owned nearly a 
quarter of all bank equity capital by June 30, 1934.196 
This first step toward stability was followed by the Banking Act of 
1933, which made many fundamental reforms, including the creation 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).197  Initially, 
 
 190 KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 157–59.  Roosevelt’s order declaring a national 
bank holiday had earlier been drafted by Hoover’s attorney general, but Hoover had 
refused to issue it.  Id. at 159. 
 191 Id. at 152.  The actual language Roosevelt used in his inaugural address is: 
“[L]et me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—
nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert 
retreat into advance.”  Id. 
 192 Id. at 158. 
 193 See id. at 81. 
 194 See KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 160 (“Hope replaced fear in the mind and 
heart of America.  From the first vibrant lines of the inaugural address, the nation 
adopted a new spirit; gloom evaporated in the face of Roosevelt’s offer of leader-
ship.”); WICKER, supra note 185, at 147 (“[T]he immediate task was to restore deposi-
tor confidence . . . by announcing a definite schedule for the reopening of the banks 
and assurances that only safe and sound banks would be licensed to do business.  
Government officials were successful in achieving that goal.  The public responded 
by redepositing hoarded currency in the reopened banks.”); DAVID M. KENNEDY, 
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–45, at 135–
37 (discussing how the banking act and radio address helped restore confidence). 
 195 The first banking act, passed in 1933, see supra text accompanying note 193, 
among other things, authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to pur-
chase preferred stock in banks as a method of restoring inadequate capital.  See Act 
of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, § 304, 48 Stat. 1, 6 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 51d), 
repealed by Act June 30, 1947, ch. 166, § 206(b), (o), 61 Stat. 208. 
 196 WICKER, supra note 185, at 147.  The amount declined by December 31, 1934 
to 14.6% for national banks and 18.7% for state-chartered banks.  Helen A. Garten, 
Essay, A Political Analysis of Bank Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 429, 451 (1994). 
 197 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168 (establishing the FDIC). 
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Roosevelt was opposed to the idea of deposit insurance but eventually 
accepted it as a compromise.198  The legislation provided for tempo-
rary insurance effective January 1, 1934 and permanent insurance for 
all banks on July 1, 1934.199  Only banks certified as solvent by a fed-
eral regulator would be eligible for insurance.200  Additional RFC in-
vestment was needed to allow all banks to be certified and insured.201  
This recapitalization of banks averted a second crisis in confidence in 
the banking system; without it, many banks would have been unable 
to remain open with FDIC insurance.202 
Although federal deposit insurance has been viewed as the 
seminal reform of banking in the United States in 1933,203 it was, as 
shown above, a reluctant addition to the package of banking reforms 
adopted.  In fact, given the size and success of the government re-
capitalization and reorganization of banks, some have questioned 
why deposit insurance was needed at all.  Again, the answer is likely 
the maintenance of public confidence in the banking system. 
[W]hy [was] deposit insurance . . . considered necessary at all, es-
pecially since Congress had already approved public recapitaliza-
tion as a means of restoring bank stability[?]  One possible expla-
nation is that deposit insurance, through its psychological effect 
on depositors, would help to guarantee the success of RFC recapi-
talizations.  Confident that they would always have immediate ac-
cess to their funds even if their bank failed, depositors would not 
participate in destabilizing runs.  This in turn would prevent the 
renewed drain of deposits from banks newly recapitalized by the 
RFC.204 
 
 198 See KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 222 (discussing compromise and noting that 
when the bill was ultimately passed, “[f]or all of its provisions, the president claimed 
full credit, to the amusement or outrage of contemporary and hindsighted observ-
ers.”); see also Garten, supra note 196, at 445–46 (discussing Roosevelt’s initial opposi-
tion to deposit insurance). 
 199 This effective date was postponed ultimately until August 23, 1935.  Charles W. 
Calomiris & Eugene N. White, The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance, in CHARLES W. 
CALOMIRIS, U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 164, 199 (2000). 
 200 See Garten, supra note 196, at 460–61. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id.; KENNEDY, supra note 185, at 202 (“To be sure, [Federal] Reserve rediscount 
and RFC stock purchases had rescued many shaky institutions because federal au-
thorities felt an obligation to keep licensed banks open.”). 
 203 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 187, at 434 (“Federal insurance of 
bank deposits was the most important structural change in the banking system to re-
sult from the 1933 panic, and, indeed in our view, the structural change most condu-
cive to monetary stability since . . . the Civil War.”). 
 204 Garten, supra note 196, at 447. 
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Indeed, because of the severity of the banking crisis of 1933, the issue 
of deposit insurance had caught the public’s attention and was there-
fore closely connected to the need to build public confidence.205  
Every FDIC-insured institution places the government’s seal to be 
seen where deposits are taken.206  Although the insurance is ubiqui-
tous today,207 it is noteworthy that the government and the industry 
felt that emphasizing federal inspection was important to restoring 
confidence in the nation’s financial institutions.208 
Also noteworthy about the response to the banking crisis of 1933 
is the locus of reform.  There was immediate, coordinated federal ac-
tion to bolster public confidence. 
 The New Deal . . . revolutionized relations between the states 
and the federal government.  It tilted the balance of power away 
from the states; that power and responsibility flowed into Wash-
ington; it was as if a war was under way.  And indeed, there was a 
war: a war against a silent, invisible enemy, but a deadly one.  
Relatively speaking, then, the states lost some of their authority.  
Washington was now the center of gravity.209 
The declaration of a banking holiday and the promise to open sound 
banks under government certification worked to calm the panic that 
had spread nationwide.  There was no assurance, in fact, that many or 
most banks would be opened, and many were in fact liquidated.210  
 
 205 See Calomiris & White, supra note 199, at 194–95 (describing how the debate 
about deposit insurance moved from “smoke-filled rooms” to “the hearts and minds 
of the public”). 
 206 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 328.2(a), 328.4(a) (2006) (banks and savings associations, re-
spectively). 
 207 See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 3.03[3], at 3-33 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“Today, virtually every chartered depository institution has federal deposit insur-
ance, either because it is required to by law . . . or because it is a market necessity for 
the institution to survive.”); 1 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION  
§ 2.2.6, at 2.64 (2000) (“While deposit insurance is generally not required as a matter 
of federal law for commercial banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, as a practical matter, federal deposit insurance is virtually a necessity.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 208 RAYMOND MOLEY WITH ELLIOT A. ROSEN, THE FIRST NEW DEAL 171 (1966) (“We 
knew how much of banking depended upon make-believe or, stated more conserva-
tively, the vital part that public confidence had in assuring solvency.”). 
 209 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 173 (2002) 
(footnote omitted). 
 210 FED’L DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (1998), available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf 
(“[D]espite the federal government’s newly adopted plans to reorganize many closed 
but viable banks, some 4,000 banks that had closed earlier in 1933 or during the 
bank holiday never reopened.”). 
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Indeed, it was uncertain exactly how the banks would be rescued.211  
Other more drastic alternatives were considered, with the political 
conditions in 1933 encouraging experimentation.212  But in the end, 
the immediate response—control taken by the federal government—
was largely followed by a return to the decentralized pattern that had 
characterized banking in the United States prior to 1933.213 
Federal insurance as a device to restore confidence was used 
again forty years later, although it is unlikely in retrospect that confi-
dence was actually lacking.  A crisis of sorts fell not upon the banks 
but upon the brokerage industry beginning in 1967.  An increasing 
volume of stock trades coupled with outdated settlement and clearing 
processes, followed by a significant market slump from 1969 to 1970, 
resulted in the so-called “back office crisis.”214  Far from being an un-
important clerical problem, the volume of back orders resulted in a 
large number of failed transactions, which, coupled with the stock 
market slump of 1969 and 1970, resulted in an unprecedented num-
ber of brokerage firm failures.215 
In response, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection 
Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).216  SIPA was intended in large part to restore in-
 
 211 See generally Garten, supra note 196, at 440–45 (discussing the choices of deposit 
insurance and recapitalization with federal investment). 
 212 See Ramirez, supra note 186, at 530 (“FDR distinguished himself from Hoover 
not by his depth of economic understanding, but rather by his willingness to take ac-
tion, to deviate from laissez-faire economics as a matter of federal policy, and to ex-
periment.  Much of the vigor that distinguished FDR from Hoover was only possible 
in the wake of almost four years of unrelenting economic meltdown.  Before this ca-
lamity, no leader of the federal government could have mustered the political 
wherewithal to support massive government involvement in the economy.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 213 See KENNEDY, supra note 194, at 366 (The New Deal banking reforms “left the 
astonishingly plural and localized American banking system in place . . . .”).  Looking 
beyond the banking reforms, it is clear that the New Deal was more revolutionary in 
other areas.  See Ramirez, supra note 186, at 569 (“The New Deal macroeconomic 
legacy is ultimately quite profound.  It shows that legislation and executive power can 
be used to secure a more powerful political economy . . . .”). 
 214 See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION § 18.03, at 18-16 (3d 
ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006); Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers?  The Securities In-
vestor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1071, 1076 (1999); SELIGMAN, supra note 184, at 450–55. 
 215 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: STEPS 
NEEDED TO BETTER DISCLOSE SIPC POLICIES TO INVESTORS 15 (2001), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01653.pdf [hereinafter GAO SIPC REPORT] (noting 
that the crisis resulted in “hundreds of securities firms merging, failing, or going out 
of business”); SELIGMAN, supra note 184, at 452–53 (noting that 160 firms went out of 
business); Joo, supra note 214, at 1078–79. 
 216 Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–
78lll (2000)). 
MICHAEL FINAL 5/25/2006  12:18:08 PM 
1116 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1075 
vestor confidence by creating an “insurance fund” managed by the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”).217  SIPC was in-
tended to be, and was perceived as, the FDIC insurance program for 
financial institutions.218 
Despite these similarities, most analysts agree that the back office 
crisis of 1967–70 was fundamentally different from the banking crisis 
of 1933.  There was no comparable panic, loss of investor confidence, 
or industry-wide “run” on securities firms in 1967–70.  Indeed, it is 
generally accepted that loss of investor confidence was a result of the 
failure of securities firms, not the cause of it.219  This in turn suggests 
 
 217 See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, H.R. REP. NO. 91-1613, at 5255 
(1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5255 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 91-
1613] (finding that “[securities firm] failures may lead to loss of customers’ funds 
and securities with an inevitable weakening of confidence in the U.S. securities mar-
kets. . . . [O]ne objective of the bill . . . is to provide investors protection against 
losses caused by the insolvency of their broker-dealer.”); Joo, supra note 214, at 1081 
(“[W]hile SIPA is intended to protect customers from loss, protecting customers is 
not an end in itself.  It is, rather, a tactic to boost investor confidence in the securities 
market . . . .”); POSER, supra note 214, § 18.03, at 18-17 (noting that loss of small in-
vestor confidence was a primary concern addressed by SIPA (citing Sec. Investor 
Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975)). 
 218 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1613, supra note 217, at 5255 (“The need is similar, in many 
respects, to that which prompted the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation . . . .”); Joo, supra note 214, at 1074 (“SIPC administers a fund to protect 
the accounts of securities investors somewhat analogous to the protection the [FDIC] 
provides for the accounts of bank depositors.”); SELIGMAN, supra note 184, at 465 
(characterizing SIPA as “creating the equivalent to a Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration for the securities industry”).  One result of this perceived similarity is some 
confusion on the part of investors, who may tend to equate the FDIC and SIPC pro-
grams and erroneously believe that SIPC protects them from a decline in the value of 
their stocks as the FDIC protects them from a decline in the value of their deposit 
accounts.  See GAO SIPC REPORT, supra note 215, at 63 (citing anecdotal evidence of 
confusion from SEC and FDIC officials); id. at 69 (noting SIPC agreement with this 
evidence).  The GAO Report notes that this confusion may only intensify as a result 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.), 
which allows increased intermingling of activities of financial institutions and securi-
ties firms.  See GAO SIPC REPORT, supra note 215, at 67–69.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act contains provisions intended to mitigate such confusion.  See Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act § 214 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34 (2000)) (making it 
unlawful to represent investment products as federally insured); § 305 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831x (2000)) (disclosure and physical segregation require-
ments intended to prevent confusion between insurance products and insured de-
posits). 
 219 See Joo, supra note 214, at 1082 (“[N]either Congress nor later commentators 
attributed the failures of brokerage firms to a loss of investor confidence in broker-
dealers’ financial stability.”); id. at 1111 & n.209 (postulating the very limited effect 
of “runs” on brokerages houses compared to runs on banks, noting that the primary 
effect of a “run” on securities firms would be a decline in stock prices); SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 184, at 466 (attributing decline in individual investor participation in the 
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that one of SIPA’s main goals—investor protection—may have been 
an inappropriate response to a “consumer panic” widely perceived by 
many but now recognized as largely non-existent.220 
2. The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s 
By 1989, the savings and loan, or “thrift” industry,221 was in what 
could fairly be termed a state of crisis.222 
The scope of the crisis and the losses caused by the crisis are stag-
gering.  During the period from 1980 to 1988, over 500 savings as-
sociations failed—more than three-and-a-half times as many as in 
the previous forty-five years combined.  In meeting its obligations 
to depositors of failed savings and loan associations, the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”), which in-
sured the deposits held by savings associations, became insolvent.  
Consequently, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board . . . , which 
was responsible for administering the FSLIC, lacked the funds to 
close hundreds of insolvent and marginally capitalized savings as-
sociations.  As a result,  . . . [they] continued to operate, incurring 
losses that were estimated to be over $20 million per day . . . .223 
This crisis had as many causes as there are analysts.  However, 
there are two main causes generally agreed upon.  First, the high in-
terest rates of the late 1970s made it difficult for institutions such as 
 
market to the price declines in 1969 to 1970 and “the widespread belief that institu-
tional investors received preferential treatment from brokers or inside information 
or had the power to manipulate stock prices”). 
 220 See Joo, supra note 214, at 1075 (“There is no indication that [instilling public 
confidence in brokerage firms and the securities markets] is still [a goal] worthy of 
concern, if indeed it ever was.”). 
 221 Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW. 1013, 1013 n.2 (1990) 
(“The thrift industry is generally regarded as consisting of three types of financial in-
termediaries: savings and loan associations, savings banks, and credit unions.  Savings 
and loan associations make up the largest segment of the thrift industry.” (citation 
omitted)).  The term distinguishes these institutions primarily from those known as 
“banks” or “commercial banks,” but the functions of each type have begun to overlap 
significantly.  See MALLOY, supra note 207, § 1.2.2, at 1.14–15 (defining “commercial 
bank” in this context); Clark et al., supra, at 1099–1100 (describing increasing simi-
larities between commercial banks and thrifts). 
 222 See Michael P. Malloy, Foreword: . . . and Backward: Death and Transfiguration 
Among the Savings Associations, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1 (1991) (characterizing the 
events as a “crisis,” “debacle,” “disaster” and “a slow, suffocating death”). 
 223 Clark et al., supra note 221, at 1013–14 (footnotes omitted); see also Carl Fel-
senfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S40 (1991) (“[T]he S&Ls 
lost some two-thirds of their number.  Their industry is virtually depleted; exhaustion 
of the thrift insurance fund is hardly their problem. . . . [T]hrifts might have to be 
absorbed by the commercial banking industry for their own protection . . . .”). 
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thrifts with long-term, low-interest assets to remain profitable.224  Sec-
ond, various “rescue” legislation was passed by Congress during the 
1980s giving thrifts new powers, which only postponed the day of 
reckoning and made the situation worse.225 
In any event, by 1989, a full-blown crisis, replete with thrift fail-
ures and thrift runs in the 1930s style, confronted the incoming Bush 
administration.  The response in February 1989 was twofold.  First, 
the federal government immediately took over the failing thrifts to 
promote order and restore confidence.226  Second, legislative changes 
were proposed which by August of that year were enacted as the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(“FIRREA”).227  Although FIRREA made significant changes in the 
industry’s regulation,228 it left intact the major institutions of banking 
in the United States. 
 
 224 See Felsenfeld, supra note 223, at S19 (“The roots of the S&L crisis are interest 
mismatches between what the S&Ls must pay for their money and what they may 
earn on that money.”); Clark et al., supra note 221, at 1020 (noting that “negative 
spread in interest rates resulted in significant losses for many savings associations,” 
and the decline in value of mortgage assets “further erod[ed] the capital bases of 
many associations”). 
 225 See Felsenfeld, supra note 223, at S20–S27 (reviewing the legislative reforms  
of the 1980s); id. at 24 (“[T]heir general objective was to support the S&L system 
through what the S&L regulators hoped would be a relatively brief troubled  
period. . . . That all could go wrong and that the industry could self-destruct was im-
plicitly deemed inconceivable.”); Clark et al., supra note 221, at 1020–22 (reviewing 
legislative reforms and the negative results); Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A 
Decade’s Journey from “Deregulation” to “Supervisory Reregulation”: The Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW. 1103, 1103 (1990) (observ-
ing that in the early 1980s “there was a cautious optimism that Congress and the fed-
eral regulators could ‘pull the ox from the ditch’ by instituting an era of ‘deregula-
tion’”).  To say these causes are “generally agreed upon” does not mean to suggest 
universal acquiescence.  See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: HOW 
DID IT HAPPEN? 70–71, 72 (1989) (contending that identifying these two changes as 
the causes of the thrift industry’s problems is “dangerously simplistic” and noting 
that the real cause of the problems was the inability to recognize and deal with losses 
of the books that created insolvent thrifts and the perverse incentives that insolvency 
creates for thrift managers and regulators). 
 226 See MALLOY, supra note 207, § 1.4.3, at 1.120–21 (describing the objectives  
of the administrative actions, including “to establish control and oversight of each 
troubled institution, [and] to promote confidence and maintain customer serv- 
ices . . . .”); Gail & Norton, supra note 225, at 1106 (“It was clearly the Administra-
tion’s number one domestic priority following President Bush’s inauguration in 
January [1989] and the pressure on Congress to act swiftly was immense.”). 
 227 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.); see MALLOY, supra note 207, § 1.4.3, at 1.121–23 (summarizing 
progress of legislation). 
 228 For a summary, see generally Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA It-
self: Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1117 (1989) and Gail & Norton, supra note 225. 
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 Although much of the structure of banking regulatory law that 
was put in place in the 1930s still is standing, albeit in a weakened 
condition, the framework of the 1930s no longer commands a 
consensus that it best serves the national interest . . . . There has 
been substantial debate over what should be the business of bank-
ing and what relationships should exist between commercial 
banks and commercial enterprises that are not banks.  There also 
has been significant debate over the ultimate size and shape of 
the entities that make up the U.S. banking market. . . . Although 
these concerns and others like them have thus eroded confidence 
in the regulatory framework of the 1930s, there has yet to develop 
an intellectual and political consensus on what must be con-
structed to replace the former structure.229 
The structure set in place in 1934 has not remained unchanged.230  
However, the thrift crisis of the 1980s demonstrated the same type of 
federal response as was seen in the 1930s.  There was swift federal ac-
tion, followed by hastily-prepared legislation, to deal with the imme-
diate crisis, in order to restore public confidence.  Only later was 
there a return in large part to pre-crisis conditions. 
3. Evaluation of Responses to the Bank and Thrift Crises 
Deposit insurance has proved to be an enduring confidence-
building mechanism.  The banking crises of 1933 and 1989 both re-
lied upon it.  Federal account insurance was also used in the “back of-
fice” crisis of 1969–70; although there was no apparent lack of inves-
tor confidence, the insurance model was chosen as the regulatory 
alternative.  The fact that the crisis of 1989 was not as widespread as 
the crisis of 1933 was due to a number of economic factors, of course, 
but also in large part to the public’s continued belief in the govern-
ment as deposit insurer of last resort.231  Federal deposit insurance has 
 
 229 1 MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
¶ 1.02[7], at 1-19 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
 230 See MALLOY, supra note 207, §§ 1.4.5 to 1.4.8.20, at 1.127 to 1.136-30 (surmising 
that many of the problems discussed in the quoted language in the text accompany-
ing note 229 have been addressed in significant banking reform legislation in 1991, 
1994 and 1999).  These are significant reforms with major regulatory issues, but they 
did not arise in times of a generally recognized crisis in confidence, and as such are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 231 See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CONFIDENCE FOR THE FUTURE: AN FDIC SYMPOSIUM 
54–55 (1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/symposium/ 
fdic15.pdf [hereinafter CONFIDENCE FOR THE FUTURE] (“It is generally agreed that 
federal deposit insurance was successful in maintaining stability in the financial sys-
tem throughout the banking crisis of the 1980s, at least in part because insured de-
positors knew that ample capacity existed and was available to make full payment on 
their claims.”). 
MICHAEL FINAL 5/25/2006  12:18:08 PM 
1120 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1075 
two overarching features that make it a credible source of confi-
dence.  First, it is “transparent,” that is, the public understands how it 
works.232  Second, it is, or appears to be, up to the task.  It has the fed-
eral backing that neither state funds nor private deposit insurance 
can duplicate.233 
In addition, once deposit insurance provided the assurance 
needed to calm depositor panic, the federal “cleanup” of banks in 
1933–34 and thrifts in 1989 provided the second step of crisis re-
sponse: delivering results.  One analyst notes, in providing interna-
tional guidance for bank crisis regulation, that “[e]vidence that triage 
is being handled efficiently should help to curtail panicky audience 
runs, but [regulators] must take up the task of helping those who 
want to take deposits out of their banks to do so in a reasoned and 
orderly manner.”234 
Finally, in both cases, the reforms left intact the multi-regulator, 
multi-level structure of bank regulation in the United States, one 
which is not inherently logical or stable.235  Analysts suggest that fur-
ther reforms of deposit insurance are likely necessary to properly ad-
 
 232 See id. at 55 (“Confidence in a deposit insurance system also is more likely if its 
basic operations are generally understood by the insured.”); see also JEREMY F. TAYLOR, 
THE BANKING SYSTEM IN TROUBLED TIMES: NEW ISSUES OF STABILITY AND CONTINUITY 12–
13 (1989) (arguing that confidence by the public in the stability of the banking sys-
tem requires an understanding of what the system is and the ability to respond effec-
tively in a system-threatening emergency). 
 233 See Kenneth E. Scott & Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Pro-
posals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 867 (1971) (“[T]he in-
surance of banks and savings and loan associations imposes an almost open-ended 
potential obligation on the insurer.  Only an institution with open-ended money-
creating power, such as the federal government, can fully assume this burden.”); see 
also Thomas E. Hales, Comments on Reform Proposals: Examining the Role of the Federal 
Government, in CONFIDENCE FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 231, at 76, 77 (“Clearly, there 
is no FDIC fund without a government guarantee.  The American consumer will not 
stand for it and should not be expected to give up federal protection for no rea-
son.”). 
 234 Edward J. Kane, Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances 33 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2453, 2000), available at http:// 
ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2453.html (click “download the selected file” but-
ton).  Kane also notes: “Paradoxically, unless the safety net is backed up by solid crisis 
planning, improvements in the safety net may result in less frequent but more devas-
tating crises.  On balance, the more effective a nation’s safety net becomes, the less 
likely it is that regulatory personnel will have prior hands-on experience in coping 
with severe crisis pressures.”  Id. at 4. 
 235 See Gail & Norton, supra note 225, at 1224 (noting that the current system “per-
petuates a highly fragmented and overly complex and redundant regulatory struc-
ture”). 
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just to industry changes.236  This demonstrates that a crisis response is 
measured by the crisis itself, and is not necessarily a springboard for 
broader reforms. 
IV. THE EMERGING REGULATORY PARADIGM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
These four stories together suggest a regulatory paradigm of cri-
sis response.  The crisis is in each case an existential new threat to the 
entity or industry—initially appearing to be beyond the capability of 
existing regulators.  This initial reaction to the jarring and new in-
formation is a retreat and an attempt at composure, as is perhaps 
natural.  In any event, such a reaction is necessary in order to provide 
the public with assurance that the crisis has been contained, at least 
for the moment.  Thereafter, emergency measures are quickly re-
placed with a new federal regulator, as was the case for each crisis dis-
cussed above, the airlines, the accountants, the meatpackers, and the 
banks.  By this method, and through the federal assurance of inspec-
tion and approval, the regulators seek to restore the public’s confi-
dence.  In each instance, there are prominent displays of the federal 
presence: the TSA inspectors at each airport, the PCAOB inspections 
of public company accounting firms, the USDA stamp of approval on 
each package of meat and poultry products, and the FDIC seal at the 
teller’s window of each financial institution.  But completing the sec-
ond step of an effective crisis response—moving from assurance to 
results—requires the involvement and expertise of the regulated in-
dustries themselves.  For example, the government intends to return 
airline passenger and cargo inspection to private entities; there is an 
initial reliance by the federal standard-setting body on private indus-
try auditing standards; and there have been experiments with self-
certification of inspection by meat and poultry processors and with a 
system of process regulation.  There is no clear analogy in the bank-
ing industry, which has relied on self-regulation in a meaningful way, 
but there has been a federal reliance on the fundamental existing 
regulatory structures.  In each instance, the reliance on the private 
sector entities is an uneasy relationship—one recognizing that the 
public’s confidence in safety and security can be fragile. 
These lessons can be and are being productively applied as we 
move to the broader challenge of protecting the nation’s entire pro-
ductive infrastructure.  This Part reviews how this paradigm has been 
 
 236 See generally John L. Douglas, Deposit Insurance Reform, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
11 (1992). 
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played out and how it will likely continue to evolve in the area of 
homeland security. 
A. The Crisis and Response 
The attacks of September 11 focused the public on terrorism as 
much or more than on air travel security.  But apart from the carnage 
of the attacks, how does a terrorist attack create a crisis?237  The goal 
of the terrorist is not simply to cause physical damage, but to thereby 
force governmental change, to “simply . . . make a statement,” or to 
“endanger our values, way of life, and the personal security of our 
citizens.”238  Or more broadly, “[a] terrorist is someone who employs 
physical or psychological violence against noncombatants in an at-
tempt to coerce, control, or simply change a political situation by 
causing terror in the general populace.  The desire to influence an 
audience is an essential component of terrorism.”239  The immediate 
crisis, therefore, beyond the physical one, is a psychological one, and 
it is this threat to which the government’s homeland security reforms 
responded. 
President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security less 
than a month after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,240 
providing a federal presence to coordinate security efforts.  The Of-
fice was intended to have five broad functions: detection (intelligence 
gathering); preparedness (first responders); prevention (primarily 
border security and domestic investigation); protection (related to in-
frastructure); and response and recovery (longer term, relating to in-
frastructure, as distinguished from the emergency activities of first re-
 
 237 Recall that a crisis is defined as an existential threat with insufficient time or 
resources for an effective response.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 238 Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach: Testimony Before the 
Subcomm. on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the H. 
Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 2 (Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Raymond J. 
Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. General Accounting 
Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02150t.pdf. 
 239 SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 69; see also George W. Bush, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive No. 7: Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Priori-
tization, and Protection, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1816 (Dec. 22, 2003) [herein-
after Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7] (“Terrorists seek to destroy, 
incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructure and key resources across the United 
States to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken our economy, and 
damage public morale and confidence.”). 
 240 See Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 8, 2001) (establishing 
the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council). 
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sponders).241  Overall, the Office’s mission was stated as “to develop 
and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national 
strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or at-
tacks.”242  This strategy is the immediate and overwhelmingly federal 
response, consistent with the crisis and response paradigm I have de-
scribed here. 
Once the Office of Homeland Security was established, detailed 
attention could be given to exactly how those functions were to be 
performed.  The government had at hand several recent comprehen-
sive studies providing templates for broader reform.243  It was clear, 
for example, that legislation would be required to provide budget 
and policy authority for the Office.244  Through a bipartisan effort, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed,245 creating a new Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS” or “Department”) which trans-
ferred and consolidated the work of dozens of agencies formerly in at 
least seven other departments, and created new functions primarily 
in intelligence and information gathering.246 
In addition to this massive consolidation and coordination, a 
main purpose of the new Department was to continue and solidify 
the federal presence first established by the Office of Homeland Se-
curity.  In proposing the Department of Homeland Security legisla-
tion, the President noted that “America needs a single, unified home-
land security structure that will improve protection against today’s 
threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of 
the future.”247  The DHS was intended to provide a “federal govern-
 
 241 See id. at § 3(b)–(f), 66 Fed. Reg. at 51,812–14.  There are other functions 
listed in § 3, but they are for the most part auxiliary policy and administrative func-
tions related to these operational functions. 
 242 Id. § 2, 66 Fed. Reg. at 51,812. 
 243 See Jonathan Thessin, Recent Developments, Department of Homeland Security, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513, 514–15 (2003) (discussing the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore 
Commissions); SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND COMBATING TERRORISM ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107-175, at 3–4 (2002) 
[hereinafter 2002 SENATE REPORT] (discussing the Hart-Rudman and Gilmore Com-
missions and the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by then-Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer). 
 244 See 2002 SENATE REPORT, supra note 243, at 8 (discussing political motivations, 
such as making the chief homeland security officer subject to Senate confirmation 
and Congressional oversight). 
 245 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
 246 See Thessin, supra note 243, at 520 & n.50 (cataloging transferred and new pro-
grams). 
 247 WHITE HOUSE REPORT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2002). 
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ment . . . focal point for leadership and coordination of terrorism 
policy.”248 
B. Moving from Assurance to Results 
The Department, as thus initially constituted, was a massive con-
glomeration of agencies, cobbled together in part for its psychologi-
cal impact, in order to show that the federal government was doing 
something.  Setting down to work is another matter.  There was no 
physical crisis which demanded immediate attention.  The mission of 
DHS—to detect, prevent, and minimize the effects of terrorism—
potentially encompasses a nationwide set of limitless assets.  The at-
tacks could come from anyone, anywhere, anytime.  As was shown in 
Part I, for a brief amount of time, people will trust the government 
merely because it is the government,249 but demonstrated competence 
is necessary for trust to be maintained in the long run.250  This is the 
main difficulty the new Department faces. 
1. Effective Reorganization 
A reorganization, such as the creation of DHS, can be an effec-
tive psychological tool as we have seen, but its uses are otherwise lim-
ited. 
 A reorganization is a questionable response to a problem that is 
not a problem of organization.  This banal point tends to be over-
looked because organizational changes are often easier and 
cheaper to make than other reforms, as they may amount to little 
more than changing job titles and redrawing a table of organiza-
tion.  At the same time they are highly visible—even dramatic—
measures and thus convey the impression, however misleading, of 
a vigorous response to an organization’s failure, even if it is not an 
organizational failure.251 
Although DHS is young, the gloss seems already to have worn away, 
and detractors abound.252  What one security analyst said about the 
 
 248 2002 SENATE REPORT, supra note 243, at 7–8 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, COMBATING TERRORISM: SELECTED CHALLENGES AND RELATED 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 2001)); see also H. REP. NO. 197-609, pt. 1, at 67 (2002) 
(quoting President Bush in a speech proposing the new DHS: “‘History teaches us 
that critical security challenges require clear lines of responsibility and the unified ef-
fort of the U.S. government.’”). 
 249 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 251 POSNER, supra note 40, at 127–28. 
 252 See id. at 128–29 (citing studies by the GAO and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies). 
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liberty-security tradeoffs made after September 11, would apply 
equally to homeland security. 
The most politically expedient option was to slap highly invasive 
and expensive countermeasures on top of existing systems.  At the 
same time, people wanted to be reassured, responding more to 
the feeling of security than to the reality; and because they were 
driven by fear, they accepted countermeasures that required ex-
treme trade-offs.  People felt that they must be getting something 
because they were giving up so much. 
 That was two years ago, though, and it’s about time we replaced 
these invasive systems with good security that mitigates the real 
threats . . . .253 
Others concur that the time is already ripe for reorganization of the 
new Department.254 
The Department responded with a proposed reorganization 
plan in July 2005.255  The two most far-reaching changes are the estab-
lishment of a Directorate of Policy to coordinate planning that was 
previously scattered in different places,256 a similar arrangement for 
domestic intelligence under a Chief Intelligence Officer, and the es-
tablishment of a Directorate for Preparedness to oversee “first re-
sponder training, citizen awareness, public health, infrastructure and 
 
 253 SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 251. 
 254 See JAMES JAY CARAFANO & PAUL ROSENZWEIG, WINNING THE LONG WAR: LESSONS 
FROM THE COLD WAR FOR DEFEATING TERRORISM AND PRESERVING FREEDOM 67 (2005) 
(“There is a sweet spot on the curve of experience when an organization has been up 
and running long enough to separate the good from the bad; this is when it is worth 
changing things before they get any further along.  The Department of Homeland 
Security is rapidly reaching that point.”). 
 255 See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Homeland Security Secretary Mi-
chael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for Department of Homeland Security 
(July 13, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4598 [hereinafter 
DHS Press Release]; see also The Secretary’s Second-Stage Review: Re-thinking the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s Organization and Policy Direction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 10–11 (July 14, 2005) (statement of Secretary Mi-
chael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security [hereinafter Chertoff Testi-
mony], available at http://www.hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyChertoff.pdf. 
 256 See DHS Press Release, supra note 255 (outlining one of the objectives as to 
“Centralize and Improve Policy Development and Coordination”).  The Directorate 
of Policy would replace the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, 
which would result in the Department’s operational units (Transportation Security 
Administration, Customs & Border Protection, Secret Service, Citizenship & Immi-
gration, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard) report-
ing directly to the Secretary.  See Robert Block, Homeland Security Overhaul is in Works, 
WALL ST. J., July 13, 2005, at A4; Chertoff Testimony, supra note 255, at 12.  The dis-
cussed objectives and hierarchy is reflected in the proposed new organizational chart 
for DHS, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/ 
DHSOrgCharts0705.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
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cyber security, and ensure proper steps are taken to protect high-risk 
targets.”257 
2. Centralization and Decentralization 
The proposed reorganization can, if implemented effectively, 
use the Department’s great size to its full advantage.  On the one 
hand, a larger organization can be more effective than several smaller 
ones in providing consistency and coordination of policies and in-
formation exchange.258  On the other hand, the Department deals 
with simply too many different operations for them to be controlled 
in a traditional hierarchical fashion. 
Terrorism can’t be defended against with a single countermea-
sure that works all the time.  Terrorism can be defended against 
only when every countermeasure works in its own way and to-
gether with others provides an immune system for our society.  
The Department of Homeland Security needs to coordinate but 
not subsume.259 
In short, a large organization must decentralize its operations (as op-
posed to information and policy) in order to be effective.260  Decen-
 
 257 DHS Press Release, supra note 255.  The Directorate for Preparedness replaces 
one for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, which “originally was set 
up to map intelligence about terrorist threats against the nation’s most vulnerable 
facilities to help set priorities for federal attention and resources” but which “made 
little headway.”  Block, supra note 256. 
 258 See SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 252 (concluding that “all these organizations 
have to communicate with each other, and that’s the primary value of a Department 
of Homeland Security”); CARAFANO & ROSENZWEIG, supra note 254, at 69 (noting that 
the consolidation of intelligence and information analysis “has been long overdue 
and contributes to the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to see the ‘big pic-
ture’”). 
 259 SCHNEIER, supra note 6, at 252. 
 260 See id. at 251 (“Security works better if it is centrally coordinated but imple-
mented in a distributed manner.”); POSNER, supra note 40, at 133–34 (“[K]nowledge 
is costly to transfer, especially knowledge that is based on intuition or, what is closely 
related, involves knowing how to do something rather than knowing facts or proce-
dures . . . . Because of the cost, the manager of a complex system is unlikely to have 
all the information he needs in order to be able to exercise control intelligently.  
Hence, the importance of decentralized methods of coordination . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)).  See generally MICHAEL E. O’HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN 
HOMELAND: ONE YEAR ON 101–15 (Michael E. O’Hanlon ed., 2003) (noting the need 
for both centralized coordination and decentralized operations in the new DHS).  
However, the ability to use such an approach may be limited by the nature of the or-
ganizations themselves.  One analyst suggests that the hierarchical, command-and-
control approach will be inherent in the new DHS because “[s]ystems for managing 
emerging threats are increasingly becoming the domain of government agencies and 
other organizations that can claim expertise in the fields of military and national se-
curity intelligence, information technology, and law enforcement,” and they will have 
“increasing influence over the activities and missions of state and local emergency 
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tralized operation means reliance on state and local governmental 
units and private sector entities.261 
Another focus of the Department’s new strategy is to answer the 
fundamental problem, mentioned earlier, of being unable to be 
strong and vigilant everywhere at once.262  The paradigm for security 
effectiveness is “risk analysis” or “risk management.”  The General 
Accounting Office has long advocated the use of risk management as 
a policy tool throughout the federal government.263  DHS has now 
adopted it as the guiding principle for preparedness operations.264 
Risk management is a systematic and analytical process to con-
sider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset . . . and to 
identify actions that reduce the risk and mitigate the conse-
quences of an attack.  An effective risk management approach in-
cludes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criti-
cality assessment.265 
Risk management is essentially a type of process regulation uniquely 
suited to the mission of DHS.266  As it would be impossible to inspect 
any sort of “product” at completion and judge it as compliant or de-
 
management agencies.”  Kathleen Tierney, Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Re-
cycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9-11, in TERRORISM AND DISASTER: NEW THREATS, 
NEW IDEAS 33, 47 (Lee Clarke ed., 2003). 
 261 The mission of DHS requires it to rely on state and local governments in addi-
tion to private entities.  The role of state and local governments is primarily as first 
responders, and the policy and legal issues involved in the relationship of the federal 
government with other levels of government are starkly different than those involved 
in the relationship with nongovernmental entities; I do not discuss them here. 
 262 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 263 See Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts 
Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 2 (Oct. 31, 2001) 
(statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, 
U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Decker Testimony], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02208t.pdf (“Since 1996, we have produced more 
than 60 reports and testimonies on the federal government’s efforts to combat ter-
rorism.  Several of these reports have recommended that the federal government use 
risk management as an important element in developing a national strategy.”). 
 264 Chertoff Testimony, supra note 255, at 4 (“[W]e as a nation must make tough 
choices about how to invest finite human and financial capital to attain the optimal 
state of preparedness.  To do this we will focus preparedness on objective measures 
of risk and performance.”). 
 265 Decker Testimony, supra note 263, at 3; accord Chertoff Testimony, supra note 
255, at 4 (“Our risk analysis is based on these three variables: (1) threat; (2) vulner-
ability; and (3) consequences.”). 
 266 See O’HANLON ET AL., supra note 260, at 86 ([A] regulatory approach, especially 
one that consists of “commands and controls” rather than market-like incentives, can 
be an unnecessarily expensive mechanism for achieving a given level of security. . . . 
These costs can be reduced, although not eliminated, through careful attention to 
the design of the regulations.  In particular, the more that they focus on processes 
and performance, rather than specific inputs, the better.”). 
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fective, DHS must of necessity focus on the process of security and 
preparedness: the process of protection.  Of the three steps in risk 
management, the first—threat assessment—is primarily an intelli-
gence problem and beyond the scope of study here.  Moreover, when 
the threat is broadly described as “terrorism,” the scope of potential 
threats is virtually unlimited, leaving threat assessment with limited 
utility in this context.  Therefore, analyses under the other two parts 
of risk management—vulnerability and criticality (or conse-
quences)—are the key policy questions.267  In assessing vulnerability, 
private-sector help is essential.  Indeed, vulnerability assessment must 
be primarily a private sector effort, as most of the critical infrastruc-
ture in the United States is privately owned.268  Therefore, the federal 
effort must rely on information developed in the private sector, and 
both Congress in the Homeland Security Act269 and the Department 
in its rules “recognize[] the importance of receiving information 
from those with direct knowledge on the security of . . . critical infra-
 
 267 See Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate Resources 
to Highest Priorities: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Management, Integration, and Over-
sight of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 11 (June 29, 2005) (statement 
of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) [hereinafter Walker 
Testimony], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05824t.pdf (“[W]e will 
never know if we have identified every threat or event and may not have complete in-
formation about the threats we have identified.  Consequently, two other elements of 
the approach, vulnerability and criticality assessments, are essential to better prepare 
against threats.”).  The General Accounting Office changed its name to the Govern-
ment Accountability Office pursuant to the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004 
§ 8(a), Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811, 814 (2004).  For more background, see 
Government Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
 268 A widely-circulated “statistic” is that approximately 85% of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure is privately owned.  See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
39, at 398 (noting without reference that “the private sector controls 85 percent of 
the critical infrastructure in the nation”).  The source of the 85% number is appar-
ently a DHS estimate.  See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Launches 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program to Enhance Homeland Secu-
rity, Facilitate Information Sharing (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?theme=43&content=3250 (“[T]he Department of Homeland Security esti-
mates that more than 85 percent [of critical infrastructure] falls within the private 
sector.”).  This has now changed to the slightly different and anonymous: “It is esti-
mated that over 85% of the critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the pri-
vate sector.”  Department of Homeland Security, Protected Critical Infrastructure In-
formation (PCII) Program: Program Overview, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?theme=92&content=3763 (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). 
 269 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201(d)(1), 116 Stat. 
2135, 2146 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1) (Supp. II 2002)) 
(directing DHS  “[t]o access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, in-
telligence information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agen-
cies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such information . . . .”). 
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structure in order to reduce the vulnerability of this critical infra-
structure to acts of terrorism.”270 
3. Establishing Trust 
The federal government has been encouraging private sector 
initiatives in infrastructure protection for many years.  In 1998, Presi-
dent Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (“PDD 63”) on 
critical infrastructure protection.271  As to preventative measures, PDD 
63 states: 
[P]rivate sector owners and operators should be encouraged to 
provide maximum feasible security for the infrastructures they 
control and to provide the government necessary information to 
assist them in that task.  In order to engage the private sector 
fully, it is preferred that participation by owners and operators in 
a national infrastructure protection system be voluntary.272 
The directive requires the federal government to “strongly encour-
age” private sector development of an information sharing and analy-
sis center (“ISAC”), whose design and functions would be determined 
by the private sector.273  The directive also organizes the federal ef-
forts around sectors of the economy, with responsibility parceled out 
among various departments and agencies.274  Thus, what ultimately 
developed was not one but a series of ISACs, each focused in an eco-
nomic sector.275  The Financial Services ISAC was the first to be organ-
ized in 1999; the most recent tally is fifteen ISACs in various sectors.276  
 
 270 Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 
18,524 (proposed Apr. 15, 2003) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 29). 
 271 See Presidential Decision Directive 63, supra note 37, at 4. 
 272 Id. at 3. 
 273 Id. at 10 (Annex A: “Information Sharing and Analysis Center”). 
 274 Id. at 8 (Annex A: “Lead Agencies”). 
 275 See generally Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Shar-
ing with Infrastructure Sectors: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Science, and 
Research & Development and Infrastructure and Border Security of the H. Select Comm. on 
Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 2, 4–5 (Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Robert F. Dacey, 
Director, Information Security Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter 
Dacey Testimony], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04699t.pdf. 
 276 Id. at i (listing ISACs in the following sectors: banking and finance, chemical 
and hazardous materials, emergency services, electric, energy, food, multi-state gov-
ernment, information technology, telecommunications, research and education, 
public transit, surface transportation, highway, water, and real estate).  The Informa-
tion Sharing and Analysis Centers Council, an organization of thirteen ISACs, notes 
in a White Paper that the first such entity, predating Presidential Decision Directive 
63, was the national Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, established in 
1984.  See INFO. SHARING & ANALYSIS CTRS. COUNCIL, A FUNCTIONAL MODEL FOR 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS: MATURING AND 
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Although PDD 63 was superseded by President Bush’s Homeland Secu-
rity Presidential Directive No. 7 in 2004,277 the new directive continues 
the same emphasis on sector-by-sector organization of both the pri-
vate entities and the federal government.278 
This system of private sector ISACs is a beginning structure on 
which to create a robust government-private sector initiative for infra-
structure protection.  The ISAC system possesses the characteristics 
necessary for effective security: it is decentralized, it includes specific 
individuals with sector-specific expertise, and it provides for cross-
sector information and coordination.279  What is needed now is a way 
to establish a trusted relationship between the ISACs and the federal 
government agencies responsible for each sector.280 
Establishing a trusted relationship with the federal government 
and collaborating groups of private industry has several important 
but not fatal problems.  Private entities are understandably reluctant 
to share information with the federal government for five broad rea-
sons.  First, disclosure to the government is risky where the informa-
tion could be used by another agency for a collateral regulatory pur-
pose.  For example, information disclosed by a company to DHS 
might be useable in an investigation or enforcement action by the 
government or a private litigant.281  Second, sharing of proprietary in-
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 278 See id. at ¶¶ 15–17 (coordination of private sector efforts), ¶ 18 (designation of 
“sector specific” federal agencies). 
 279 See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text. 
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formation among industry competitors can result in economic injury 
if it is exploited by a competitor, but if the information is not so ex-
ploited, the conduct of the industry group may be considered anti-
competitive under antitrust laws.  Third, information, once given to 
the government, is subject to the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”)282 and may have to be disclosed.283  Fourth, the information 
“sharing” with the federal government is viewed by the private sector 
to be more of a one-way flow, since the government’s ability to dis-
close information to the private sector may be limited by privacy laws 
and the government’s interest in using the information for law en-
forcement or national security purposes.  Fifth, even if there were 
none of these perceived disadvantages, the production and distribu-
tion of information is costly for a business, and no rational business, 
however patriotic, will undertake the effort without a perceived bene-
fit that exceeds the cost.284 
Some of these concerns have been addressed.  For example, 
Congress addressed the FOIA problem with the Critical Infrastruc-
ture Information Act of 2002, part of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002.285  DHS implemented these requirements by inaugurating the 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (“PCII”) Program on 
February 18, 2004.286  The law and regulations provide that PCII is not 
subject to disclosure under FOIA or any similar law.287  In addition, 
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there has been significant federal funding for some ISACs which 
work in tandem with federal agencies regulating their sectors.288 
However, much work remains to be done.  Both the ISAC trade 
group and the GAO emphasize the immediate need for increased 
federal funding and for the development of standards which will al-
low the private entities to trust the information sharing arrangements 
both within each ISAC and between the ISAC and the government.289  
There remains a stubbornly enduring hesitancy to share informa-
tion.290 
The arrangement between DHS and the private entities who are 
encouraged to share information on critical infrastructure is unlike 
the previous models of crisis and regulatory response.  It was not 
borne of any one particular crisis, and it is a campaign that is volun-
tary in nature and involves as yet no substantive regulation.  It is un-
stated what DHS is to do with information which may suggest that a 
particular critical infrastructure is not adequately protected.  The 
government therefore lacks the ability to offer a significant incentive 
to the private entities to comply, which is a key factor in any coopera-
tive program.291  By contrast, other homeland security initiatives, such 







 288 See Dacey Testimony, supra note 275, at 18–22 (noting at least five ISACs which 
are partially or fully funded by the federal government). 
 289 See id. at 31–33 (building trusted relationships); id. at 35 (government fund-
ing); ISAC COUNCIL WHITE PAPER, supra note 276, at 7 (noting the need for govern-
ment financial support and establishment of a “TRUSTED information sharing and 
analysis process”). 
 290 See Walker Testimony, supra note 267, at 13 (noting “the need for the comple-
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program of approving products and technologies in exchange for re-
duced liability293 have an incentive built in to encourage private entity 
participation.294 
CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps unsettling, though not surprising, that humankind 
continues to generate crises which threaten the existence of its major 
institutions and industries.  It is therefore perhaps as comforting that 
there is a demonstrated pattern of crisis response that has proved ef-
fective and enduring through the years.  It is a useful pattern as we 
seek to address the larger problem of homeland security. 
The key features of self-regulation make it an especially useful 
tool in dealing with the challenges that global terrorism brings to the 
domestic front.  The potential dangers are boundless.  To provide 
safety and security, control must be coalesced at the top, but the re-
sponsibility must be spread to the regulated entities.  It is they who 
know the dangers best, and they who also have the greatest incentive 
to have their industries perceived as safe and secure.  Furthermore, 
the focus with respect to terrorism must be on regulating the process 
rather than the product; this is an area especially well-suited for care-
fully supervised process regulation by the regulated entities. 
This is a pattern, not a simple formula.  There is no “one size fits 
all” pattern for crisis response, for three main reasons.  First, the 
problem is partly if not largely psychological, and the response must 
be tailored to the public’s fear.  Second, each regulated industry is 
unique in its composition of firms and associations and the degree to 
which sound science will yield solutions that work.  Finally, the politi-
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fied anti-terrorism technologies.” Id. § 862 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 441 
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cal system ultimately controls, in the unsure fashion of coalition and 
consensus building, the degree and direction of reform. 
However, in the final analysis, the pattern provides a useful di-
rection for public policy in regulating for safety and security.  Prop-
erly used, it can assure that the next crisis, wherever it appears and 
however tragic the consequences, can be met with a response that is 
swift and effective to assure the public’s need to be and feel safe and 
secure, in large part because we already know what to do. 
 
